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ABSTRACT 
 The South African (“SA”) mining industry played (and continues to play) a pivotal 
role in the development of the SA economy. It is therefore no surprise that the industry has 
long been the beneficiary of favourable tax concessions. One of these favourable tax 
concessions is the 100% capital expenditure allowance. Access to this allowance is dependent 
on the interpretation of the definition of “mining operations” in section 1(1) of the Income 
Tax Act, No. 58 of 1962 (“the ITA”).   
 Currently, there is legal uncertainty in SA regarding the meaning of “mining 
operations”. This is so because central to the term “mining operations” is the term “mineral”, 
which is not defined in the ITA, nor does it have an ordinary fixed meaning. SA courts have 
further not authoritatively dealt with the meaning of “mining operations” despite being 
presented with the opportunity to do so in recent case law. This legal uncertainty is further 
fuelled by a recent draft interpretation note issued by the South African Revenue Service 
(“SARS”), expressing the view that quarrying operations for inter alia clay for brickmaking 
and limestone for the manufacture of cement, do not constitute “mining operations”. 
Practically, this legal uncertainty may act as a deterrent to mining companies incurring capital 
expenditure, essentially curbing the development of the SA mining industry.  
 This study seeks to analyse the different meanings attributed by SARS, SA academic 
writers and SA courts to the definition of “mining operations” (and the related meaning of 
“mineral”) for income tax purposes. The purpose of this analysis is to determine whether the 
extraction of clay for brickmaking and limestone for the manufacture of cement constitutes 
“mining operations”. Against this background, Australian legislation and case law on the 
interpretation of the term “mining operations” and “mineral” will be studied in order to draw 
a comparison between SA and Australia’s treatment of “mining operations”.  
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 This study further interprets the meaning of “mining operations” through the 
application of the Savignian interpetation model in terms of which it is concluded that useful 
guidance can be sought by SA from Australian jurisprudence when interpreting the meaning 
of the term “mining operations” for income tax purposes and that the purposive test applied 
in Australia should be adopted by SA courts. Based on the application of this guidance, the 
key finding of this dissertation is that the extraction of clay for brickmaking and limestone for 
the manufacture of cement should in principle qualify as “mining operations” and that the 
capital expenditure incurred in this regard should be eligible for the 100% capital expenditure 
allowance.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and objectives 
 Given South Africa’s (“SA”) position as a country with an abundance of mineral 
resources, it is no surprise that the mining industry was historically positioned as the main 
driver of the development of SA’s economy.1 With the discovery of gold in the 
Witwatersrand basin in 1886, the gold rush ensued and SA’s economy boomed.2 Through the 
provision of employment, the earning of foreign income and the generation of tax revenues 
for the fiscus, the mining industry made significant contributions to the development of the 
SA economy. 
 The mining industry is a cyclical industry inherently fraught with risk.3 A mine’s 
lifecycle generally consists of four phases: exploration, development, production and mine 
closure.4 Significant capital investment is required during the exploration phase of a mine’s 
life cycle. Revenues are, however, often delayed for decades to the end of the cycle.5  This 
mismatch between expenditure and revenue, coupled with the pivotal economic (notably the 
industry’s contribution to the fiscus) and socio-political role the mining industry plays in SA, 
explains why the SA mining industry has long been the beneficiary of favourable tax 
concessions.6  
 One of these favourable tax concessions is the 100% capital expenditure allowance. In 
1945, the legislature introduced a 100% allowance for upfront capital expenditure incurred by 
new gold mines provided the mining lease was granted after 28 February 1946.7 Various 
                                                             
1 C. Smit, "The Role of Mining in the South African Economy,"  https://www.sablog.kpmg.co.za/2013/12/role-
mining-south-african-economy/ (accessed 21 June, 2017). 
2 Ibid. 
3 Davis Tax Committee, "First Interim Report on Mining for the Minister of Finance," (2014), 41. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Western Platinum Limited v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 67 SATC 1, 2. (2005). 
7 M. Van Blerk, "Mining Tax in South Africa,"  (Rivonia: Taxfax CC, 1992), C-7. 
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extensions to the mines qualifying for the 100% capital expenditure allowance were made 
over the years. However, it was not until 1972, that the 100% capital expenditure allowance 
was extended to all mines.8 
 The 100% capital expenditure allowance is found in section 15(a) read with section 
36 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (“ITA”) and provides that a taxpayer may deduct 100% 
of its capital expenditure against income derived from the taxpayer’s “mining operations”. It 
is therefore essential that the taxpayer carries on “mining operations” in order to qualify for 
the 100% capital expenditure allowance.  
 Although the ITA defines “mining operations”, the term “minerals” (which is central 
to the former term’s definition) is not defined.9 The lack of a definition for “minerals” has led 
to differing interpretations by the South African Revenue Service (“SARS”) and taxpayers of 
the ambit of “mining operations”, with SARS naturally favouring a narrow interpretation and 
taxpayers favouring a wider interpretation.10  
 The recent shake-up in the mining industry due to events such as the 2008 financial 
crisis (leading to lower commodity prices and rising operational cost and prolonged labour 
strikes),11 has led to a decline in the mining industry’s contribution to SARS’ tax revenues. 
PwC’s Mine 2017 reports that although the top 40 mining companies have “recovered from 
their race to the bottom” in 2017 by increasing their profitability and bolstering their balance 
sheets, there has been a significant decline in capital expenditure.12 Capital expenditure fell 
by 41% from 2016 to a historical low of $50 million.13 This is worrying considering that the 
                                                             
8 Ibid., C-8. 
9 See section 1(1) of the Income Tax Act. 
10 A. Myburgh, "The Taxation of South African Mining and Prospecting Companies: Certain and Predictable?," 
ENS, https://www.ensafrica.com/news/The-Taxation-of-South-African-Mining-and-Prospecting-Companies-
Certain-and-Pred?Id=1241&STitle=tax%20ENSight (accessed 7 July, 2017). 
11 Notably the strike in Marikana where police shot dead 34 Miners. 
12 PwC, "Mine 2017, Stop. Think... Act," (2017), 4. 
13 Ibid. 
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bulk of the capital expenditure incurred relates to sustainability efforts rather than the 
development of further mining operations.14 
 SARS on the other hand is facing increased pressure from National Treasury to 
increase tax revenues.15 This has led to SARS clamping down on taxpayers which (in SARS’ 
view) do not carry on “mining operations” in terms of its narrow interpretation. In this regard, 
SARS has issued a draft interpretation note in which SARS submits that extracting materials 
such as, inter alia, clay for brickmaking and limestone for the manufacture of cement do not 
constitute “mining operations” as defined in the ITA as SARS is of the view that these 
substances do not constitute “minerals” (“draft IN”) .16  
 As the focus of this dissertation is on the extraction of clay for brickmaking and 
limestone for the manufacture of cement, it is useful to briefly refer to the common meaning 
of clay and limestone, the processes of brickmaking and cement manufacturing, as well as the 
capital assets used to extract clay and limestone. In this regard, the Oxford Dictionary of 
English define “clay” as follows: 
a stiff, sticky fine-grained earth that can be moulded when wet, and is dried to make 
bricks, pottery and ceramics; sediment with particles smaller than silt, typically less 
than 0.002 mm.17 
 
 The three most common types of clay used in brickmaking are surface clay, shale clay 
and fire clay.18 Surface clays are found near the surface and constitute either recently formed 
sedimentary formations or are the result of the up thrusting of older deposits.19 Shale clays 
                                                             
14 Ibid. 
15 Myburgh. 
16 SARS, "Draft interpretation note on whether certain quarrying operations consitute mining operations," ed. 
SARS (2015). 
17 "Oxford English Dictionary," ed. A. Stevenson and C. Soanes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
18 The Detering Company, "General Overview of Brick Manufacturing,"  http://www.detering.com/re-li/Brick-
&-Stone/TDC-Additional-Brick-Information.pdf (accessed 21 June, 2017). 
19 Ibid. 
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are hardened sedimentary rocks made out of thin layers with sharp edges.20 Fireclays are 
highly resistant to heat and are extracted at a deeper level than surface clays and shale clays.21 
 The brickmaking making process can be divided into six phases:22 
1. Extraction of raw materials – excavators are used to extract the clay materials after which 
the clay materials are loaded onto dump trucks for transportation from the quarry to the 
manufacturing site.23  
2. Preparation – the clay materials are grinded, milled and mixed with other substances to 
achieve the right consistency and homogeneity.24 
3. Shaping – extrusion dies are used to shape the clays into the desired brick shapes.25 
4. Drying – the clay bricks are dried to extract moisture and prepare the clays for firing.26 
5. Firing – the clay bricks are fired in a kiln at temperatures ranging between 1000°C and 
1200°C depending on the type of clay and for 40 to 150 hours depending on the type of 
kiln used. After firing, the clays are cooled and ready for packaging.27 
6. Packaging and delivering – the bricks are packed for shipping and delivered to the 
client.28 
 With regard to the meaning of limestone, the Oxford Dictionary of English gives the 
following definition: 
a hard sedimentary rock, composed mainly of calcium carbonate or dolomite, used as 
building material in the making of cement.29 
                                                             
20 H. King, "Shale,"  http://geology.com/rocks/shale.shtml (accessed 21 June, 2017). 
21 The Detering Company,  1. 
22 Ibid.; Wienerberger, "The World of Brick Production,"  http://clay-wienerberger.com/expertise/the-world-of-
brick-production- (accessed 21 June, 2017). International Labour Office, "Small-Scale Brickmaking," ed. 
International Labour Organisation, Technological Series (1984), 16. 
23Era Stene (Pty) Ltd, "Mining Work Programme," Department Mineral Resources, 8.   
24 F. Kraukamp et al., "Clay Brick Manufacture," in Clay Brick Technical Guide, ed. The Clay Brick 
Association of South Africa (2015), 2. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., 3. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 "Oxford English Dictionary." 
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 By definition, limestone is composed of 50% or more calcium carbonate. Other 
materials present in limestone in small quantities may include feldspar, quartz, clay minerals, 
pyrite and other minerals.30  
 The cement manufacture process follows similar phases to the brickmaking process 
and can be outlined as follows: 
1. Extraction of raw materials – the raw materials used in the manufacture of cement are 
limestone, clay and sand.31 Limestone is used for its calcium content, while the sand and 
clay are used for its aluminium, silica and iron content.32 Limestone is extracted either by 
surface stripping or the use of explosives. In surface stripping, the surface of the deposit 
is stripped using crawler tractors (large bulldozers) to extract the limestone.33 Where 
explosives are used, drillers are first used to drill holes in the earth at the quarry site after 
which explosives are placed in the holes. The blasting separates the limestone deposit 
from the earth.34  Wheel loaders and dump trucks are used to transport the limestone from 
the quarry to the manufacturing site.35 
2. Proportioning, grinding and combining – the ideal mix for cement is 80% limestone and 
20% clay and sand. The mix is grinded and blended to produce a fine powder.36 
3. Pre-heating – the mix is pre-heated by the emitted gasses of the kiln in order to save 
energy.37 
4. Heating – the mix is heated at temperatures up to 1450°C.38 This causes a chemical 
reaction called decarbonation in terms of which calcium dioxide is released and calcium 
                                                             
30 H. King, "Limestone." 
31 Lafarge South Africa Holdings (Pty) Ltd, "Manufacturing Process,"  
http://www.lafarge.co.za/wps/portal/za/2_2_1-Manufacturing_process (accessed 21 June, 2017). 
32 J. Afsar, "Cement Manufacturing Process,"  http://www.engineeringintro.com/uncategorized/cement-
manufacturing-process/ (accessed, 21 June 2017).  
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
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and silicon dioxide combine to form the primary ingredient for cement i.e. calcium 
silicate. The calcium silicate is formed in the shape of clinker.39  
5. Cooling and grinding – the clinker is cooled, grinded and gypsum is added to the mix. To 
form a fine powder which is known as cement.40 
6. Packaging and delivering – the cement is stored in silos and shipped in bulk.41 Some of 
the cement it is packed in 20kg to 40kg bags for clients who only need a small quantity of 
cement.42  
 In both the brickmaking process and the cement manufacture process, expensive 
capital machinery such as excavators, dump trucks crawler tractors, and wheel loaders are 
used during the extraction phase. In this regard, the purpose of this dissertation is to 
determine whether these capital assets should in principle qualify for the 100% capital 
expenditure allowance. To achieve this purpose, this study will attempt to delineate the scope 
of the 100% capital expenditure allowance by analysing the meaning of the term “mining 
operations” for income tax purposes. Specifically, it will be considered whether (or when) the 
extraction of clay for brickmaking and limestone for the manufacture of cement will 
constitute “mining operations”. Should this question be answered in the affirmative, the 
above-mentioned capital assets should in principle qualify for the 100% capital expenditure 
allowance (assuming the other requirements are met).   
1.2 Research question and scope 
 The main research question is whether the extraction of clay for brickmaking and 
limestone for cement manufacture constitute “mining operations” as defined in the ITA.  
                                                                                                                                                                                             
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
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 Under the umbrella of the main research question, are the following ancillary 
questions: 
 Whether the term “mining operations” should be given a wide or narrow interpretation. 
 Whether “clay” and “limestone” are “minerals” for purposes of the ITA.  
 This analysis is limited to determining the meaning of “mining operations” for income 
tax purposes and references to legislation other than the ITA are merely for comparative 
purposes. The focus of this study is further limited to phase 1 of the brickmaking and cement 
manufacture process, and therefore, will not consider the difference between mining and 
manufacturing, including the question of where the mining operation ends and the 
manufacturing process begins. 
1.3 Research method 
 In addressing the research question a doctrinal investigative method will be used.  
According to McKerchar, doctrinal research can be described as “the traditional or ‘black 
letter law’ approach and is typified by the systematic process of identifying, analysing, 
organising and synthesising statutes, judicial decisions and commentary.”43  
 Applying the doctrinal investigative method, primary sources such as the ITA and SA 
case law dealing with the meaning of “mining operations” will be analysed and interpreted. 
Regard will further be had to secondary sources such as the principles of statutory 
interpretation, the ordinary dictionary meanings of these terms, other SA legislation that 
contain the aforementioned terms, SARS’ interpretation of these terms as evidenced in the 
draft IN, Australian legislation and case law where the meaning of these terms have been 
considered, and publications by SA and Australian researchers.  
                                                             
43 M. McKerchar, "Philosophical Paradigms, Inquiry Strategies and Knowledge Claims: Applying the Principles 
of Research Design and Conduct to Taxation," eJournal of Tax Research 6 (1) (2008). 
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 Compressive searches for primary and secondary sources were done on the 
LexisNexis Electronic Library database, SAePublications, Netlaw, Heinonline and Westlaw. 
Internet searches were also done for industry related knowledge. As all primary and 
secondary sources used contain information available in the public domain, no ethical 
considerations are necessary. 
1.4 Chapter Overview 
 Chapter 2 provides a brief overview of the principles applicable to the interpretation 
of legislation, including a brief exposition of the Savignian interpretation model. The purpose 
of Chapter 2 is to outline the theories and methods which are used to determine the intention 
of the legislature with regard to specific legislative provisions, such as the ITA’s definition of 
“mining operations” in section 1(1), and the capital expenditure allowance provisions 
contained in sections 15(a) and 36 of the ITA. 
  Chapter 3 analyses the meaning attached to “mining operations” by SARS, in SA 
case law and by SA academic researchers.  
 Against the justification for the use of foreign jurisprudence in statutory interpretation 
outlined in Chapter 2, Chapter 4 considers the development of legal jurisprudence in 
Australia relating to the meaning of “mining operations” and “mineral”. Specific 
consideration is given to the meaning attached to these terms by the Australian Tax Tribunal 
(“the ATT”) and Australian courts in the context of the Australian Customs Act, No. 6 of 
1901 (“the Customs Act”). This could be meaningful as, the definition of “mining 
operations” in the Customs Act is similar to the definition of “mining operations” in the ITA.  
 Chapter 5 applies the Savignian interpretation model set out in Chapter 2. Under the 
Savignian analysis the approach adopted in Australia to interpret the meaning of “mining 
operations” is compared to SA’s approach in order to determine whether clay used in 
brickmaking and limestone used in manufacturing cement are “minerals” for SA income tax 
16 
 
purposes. After such comparison, Chapter 5 concludes on whether guidance can be sought by 
SA from Australian jurisprudence when interpreting the meaning of the term “mining 
operations” for income tax purposes. Finally, Chapter 5 answers the research question and 
concludes whether the extraction of clay for brickmaking and limestone for the manufacture 
of cement in principle constitute “mining operations” for purposes of the ITA.  
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CHAPTER 2: PRINCIPLES OF STAUTORY INTEPRETATION 
2.1 Introduction 
 The process of statutory interpretation involves the application of the body of rules 
used to determine and justify the meaning of a statute or statutory provision.44 The “body of 
rules” referred to are rules and presumptions with their origin in the common law, the 
Interpretation Act, No. 33 of 1957 and in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996 (“the Constitution”). Du Plessis gives the following explanation of statutory 
interpretation:  
Statutory (and constitutional) interpretation is about construing enacted law-texts with 
reference to and reliance on other law-texts, concretising the text to be construed so as 
to cater for the exigencies of an actual or hypothesised concrete situation ….45 
 According to Dickerson, the process of statutory interpretation is two-fold: Firstly, it 
involves the determination of the meaning of the text, and secondly, it involves the 
application of said meaning to an actual situation.46 Although the process of statutory 
interpretation is a technical exercise, it is not mechanical, “but also involves a psychological 
and imaginative procedure using value judgements”.47 
 The need for statutory interpretation arises due to the uncertainty of the meaning of 
legislative provisions. This is because “the written and spoken word are imperfect renderings 
of human thought, and in the case of legislation.... courts are obliged to use specific rules of 
interpretation to construe the meaning legislation.”48 
                                                             
44 J. De Ville, "Meaning and Statutory Interpetation " THRHR 62 (1999): 374. 
45 L.M. Du Plessis, Re-interpretation of Statutes (Butterworths, 2002). Du Plessis, L.M., Re-Interpretation of 
Statutes (Butterworths: 2002) 18. 
46 F.R. Dickerson, The interpretation and application of statutes (Little, Brown, 1975), 21-22. 
47 G.E. Devenish, The Interpretation of Statutes (Juta, Limited, 1992), 2. 
48 C.J.  Botha, Statutory Interpretation: An Introduction for Students (Juta, 2005), 2. 
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 What is clear is that the uncertainty is the result of language’s inability to effectively 
and clearly convey the intention of the legislature.49 This was acknowledged by Schreiner JA 
in Savage v CIR (“the Savage case”)50 where he said that "...what seems to be a clear 
meaning to one man may not seem clear to another."51  
 Due to the impact fiscal statutes have on taxpayers, any uncertainty with regard to tax 
will involve the interpretation of a statute, as all taxes are levied in terms of statute law.52 
Statutory interpretation is especially relevant to determine the meaning of terms defined in 
legislation, as the meaning of these terms determine the parameters of the legislation.53 
 A question that arises when interpreting fiscal legislation (as opposed to other 
legislation) is whether fiscal legislation is subject to special rules of interpretation? At first 
glance it may seem that this would be the case, however, Emslie is of the view that this 
perception is merely the result of the application of the general principles of statutory 
interpretation.54 This view is confirmed in the Pension Fund case where the court does not 
draw any distinction between fiscal legislation and other legislation, or even between 
legislation and contracts:  
Interpretation is the process of attributing meaning to the words used in a document, 
be it legislation, some other statutory instrument, or contract, having regard to the 
context provided by reading the particular provision or provisions in the light of the 
document as a whole and the circumstances attendant upon its coming into 
existence.55 (Own emphasis.) 
                                                             
49 E.A. Kellaway, Principles of legal interpretation of statutes, contracts and wills (Butterworths, 1995), 3. 
50 Savage v Commisioner for Inland Revenue, 4 South African Law Reports 400 (1951). 
51 Ibid., 410 F-G. 
52 J. Tiley et al., Comparative Perspectives on Revenue Law: Essays in Honour of John Tiley (Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 8. P.A. Swanepoel, "An Analysis of the Purposive Approach to the Interpretation of 
South African Fiscal Legislation" (University of Pretoria, 2012), 10. 
53 P.J.  Badenhorst, "Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 : a geologist as devil's 
advocate for a change? ," Obiter 29, no. 1 (2008): 35. 
54 T. Emslie, D. Davis, and S.J. Hutton, Income Tax Cases and Materials (Taxpayer CC, 1994), 17. 
55 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality, 4 South African Law Reports 593, para 18 
(2012). 
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 There are many different theories of statutory interpretation.56 These theories are 
sometimes conflicting and sometimes complementary, but to an extent all these theories have 
overlapping principles.57 Cowen points out that these theories are differentiated by their 
views on the intention of the legislature, the role of language in determining the meaning of 
words, the function of the judiciary in interpreting statutes and the time-frame in which 
legislation operates.58 
 This chapter will consider three main theories of the interpretation of statutes 
(including fiscal legislation) in SA: the literal approach, purposive approach and the 
teleological approach. All three theories acknowledge the importance of the legislature’s 
intention. The literal approach construes the legislator’s intention from the words used. 
Consider for example, the dictum of Kotze J in R v Kirk59: 
We can only arrive at the intention of the legislature by construing the actual words 
used. We cannot insert words or assume intention.60  
 In comparison, the purposive approach refers to intention in the broad sense. The 
intention of the legislature is established by determining the purpose of the legislation.  For 
example, in Stellenbosch Farmers’ Wineries v Distillers Corporation (SA) Ltd61 Van Blerk 
JA said:  
om agter die betekenis van die woorde te kom, moet vasgestel word wat die doel was 
wat die wetgewer voor oë gehad het, en wat die rede vir die aanname van die artikel 
was” (To determine the meaning of words, the purpose of the legislator and the reason 
behind the introduction of the provision must be established; my translation).62  
 The teleological approach goes even further than the purposive approach. In terms of 
the teleological approach the legislator’s intention is determined with regard to the purpose of 
                                                             
56 R. Sullivan and E.A. Driedger, Driedger on the Construction of Statutes (Butterworths, 1994), 252.  
57 G.E. Devenish, "Teleological evaluation: a theory and modus operandi of statutory interpretation in South 
Africa," SAPL 62 (1991): 62. 
58 D.V. Cowen, "Prolegomenon to a Restatement of the Principles of Statutory Interpretation " TSAR  (1976): 
150. 
59 R v Kirk, 564 (1914).  
60 Ibid., 567. 
61 Stellenbosch Farmers’ Wineries v Distillers Corporation (SA) Ltd, South African Law Reports 458 (1962).  
62 Ibid., 473F. 
20 
 
the legislation read in the context of the values purported in the Bill of Rights.  A classic 
example is found in Department of Land Affairs v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd63 
where Moseneke DCJ said the following: 
It is by now trite that not only the empowering provision of the Constitution but also 
of the Restitution Act must be understood purposively because it is remedial 
legislation umbilically linked to the Constitution. Therefore, in construing “as a result 
of past racially discriminatory laws or practices” in its setting of section 2(1) of the 
Restitution Act, we are obliged to scrutinise its purpose. As we do so, we must seek to 
promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. We must prefer a 
generous construction over a merely textual or legalistic one in order to afford 
claimants the fullest possible protection of their constitutional guarantees. In 
searching for the purpose, it is legitimate to seek to identify the mischief sought to be 
remedied. In part, that is why it is helpful, where appropriate, to pay due attention to 
the social and historical background of the legislation. We must understand the 
provision within the context of the grid, if any, of related provisions and of the statute 
as a whole including its underlying values. Although the text is often the starting point 
of any statutory construction, the meaning it bears must pay due regard to context. 
This is so even when the ordinary meaning of the provision to be construed is clear 
and unambiguous.64 (Own emphasis.) 
 This chapter will conclude with an examination of Du Plessis version of Savigny’s 
method of statutory interpretation – a method of interpretation combining the literal, 
purposive and teleological approaches to statutory interpretation. 
2.2 Literal approach 
 A classic formulation of the literal approach is found in the following passage by 
Innes J in Venter v Rex:65 
By far the most important rule to guide courts in arriving at [the legislature’s] 
intention is to take the language of the instrument, or of the relevant portion of the 
instrument, as a whole; and, when the words are clear and unambiguous, to place 
upon them their grammatical construction and to give them their ordinary effect.66 
                                                             
63 Department of Land Affairs v Goedgelegen Tropical Fuirts (Pty) Ltd, 6 South African Law Reports, para 53 
(2007). 
64 Ibid., 53. 
65 Venter v R, 910 (1907). 
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 The primary rule of interpretation equates the intention of the legislator with the 
ordinary meaning of the statutory provision.67 The ordinary grammatical meaning of words is 
found in dictionaries.68 Dictionaries give various alternative definitions for words, however, it 
is accepted that the first definition is the meaning most commonly used.69 
 The primary rule of interpretation may only be departed from in the following two 
situations:  
1. Where the application thereof would “lead to an absurdity so glaring that it could never 
have been contemplated by the legislature”, 70 or “lead to a result which is “unjust, 
unreasonable, inconsistent with other provisions, or repugnant to the general object, tenor 
or policy of the case”.71 In such a case, the “golden rule” 72 is invoked to modify the 
language; or 
2.  Where the language is ambiguous, where if so, the mischief rule is invoked. This rule 
envisages a consideration of the purpose of the legislature in enacting the legislation and 
the words are read in light of the apparent purpose of the legislation.73 
 The language may be modified as follows in terms of the golden rule: If the “plain” 
meaning of the statutory provision would lead to an absurdity as described above, the 
interpreter may have regard to the so-called “secondary-aids”.74 For example, the long title of 
a statute, headings of chapters and sections, the text in the other official language, etc.75 
                                                             
67 Principal Immigration Officer v Hawabu, 26, 31 (1936). 
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Should the secondary aids prove insufficient to establish the intention of the legislator, the 
interpreter may resort to so-called “tertiary-aids” i.e. the common law presumptions.76  
 The mischief rule was adopted in Heydon’s case,77 where Lord Coke posed four 
questions to assist in the determination of the meaning of a text:78 
 What was the legal position before the relevant Act was introduced?79 
 Against what mischief or defect in the legal position before the Act, is the Act 
directed?80 
 How does the Act address the mischief or defect?81 
 What is the real reason for the remedy provided for in the Act?82 
 The literal approach, also known as the “orthodox approach” to statutory 
interpretation, was adopted in SA law in 1875 by De Villiers, CJ in De Villiers v Cape 
Divisional Council.83 The literal approach has its origins in English law and not Roman-
Dutch law (on which our common law is based). SA courts traditionally favoured the literal 
approach to statutory interpretation when interpreting fiscal legislation.84 For example, in 
Cape Brandy Syndicate v Inland Revenue Commissioner85 Rowlatt J made the following 
remarks:  
In a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no equity about 
a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing to be 
implied. One can only look fairly at the language used.86 
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 Justification for the literal approach was found in the maxims, judicis st ius dicere sed 
non dare, meaning the court must state the law, not make it,87 and casa ommisus, meaning 
only the legislature may supply an omission in a law.88 
 The literal approach has several shortcomings. Firstly, it is based on the assumption 
that words have a fixed ordinary meaning separate from their context.89 This assumption is 
easily disproved. The dictionary meaning of a term is usually taken as its ordinary meaning. 
However, dictionaries acknowledge that language has no intrinsic meaning and that the 
meaning of text is interdependent on context. Therefore, dictionaries contain alternative 
meanings of terms depending on the context in which the term is used.  
 Secondly, the literal approach is inherently subjective.90 The legislator’s intention is 
directly determined by the court’s own understanding of the clarity of the legislative 
provisions.91 This is based on the flawed premise that the majority of legislative provisions 
are clear and only capable of one interpretation.92 As pointed out by Shreiner JA in the 
Savage case,93 “…The ‘literal’ meaning is not something revealed to judges by a sort of 
authentic dictionary; it is only what individual judges think is the literal meaning”.94  
 Thirdly, valuable internal and external aids of interpretation and common law 
presumptions are treated as a measure of “last resort”95 and only invoked where there is an 
obvious absurdity.96 Thus Driedger is of the view that for the golden rule to be invoked, the 
absurdity must be obvious. However, as pointed out by De Villers JA in Shenker v The 
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96 Sullivan and Driedger, 5.  
24 
 
Master97 this is problematic as “what seems an absurdity to one man does not seem absurd to 
another.”98  Furthermore our courts are reluctant to find that an absurdity exists and therefore 
require that the absurdity must be “utterly glaring”. However, as Cowen points out the 
distinction between an absurdity and an absurdity which is “utterly glaring” is inherently 
arbitrary.99  
 Lastly, the role of the judiciary is stripped to mere enforcement of enacted law. Little 
room is left for judges to give effect to the intention of the legislature where the intention is 
not reflected in the letter of the law.100  
 In Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism,101 the 
Constitutional Court gave the pure literal approach its final blow by holding that the literal 
approach is no longer appropriate for two reasons: Firstly, section 39(2) of the Constitution 
requires an interpretation that advances the values crystalised in the Bill of rights,  and 
secondly, a linguistic turn has taken place and regard must be shown to the context in which 
words appear.102 
2.3 Purposive approach 
 In terms of the purposive approach, the predominate factor in interpretation, is to give 
effect to the purpose of the legislature in enacting legislation, with reference to the words the 
legislature chose to use.103 The purpose of the legislation should be determined with reference 
to the context in which the legislation was enacted.104 In considering the context in which the 
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legislation was enacted, specific regard should be had to the social and political policy 
considerations underlying the enactment of the legislation.105 
 As put by Devenish, the purposive approach acknowledges that the concept of the 
“intention of the legislature” is fiction, and looks further than the manifested intention to the 
very real purpose of legislation.106 As acknowledged by Cowen it is well known that 
legislation is always enacted with a purpose.107 Nugent and Lewis JJA, explain the purposive 
approach in Standard General Insurance Co Ltd v Commissioner for Customs and Excise108 
as follows:  
Rather than attempting to draw inferences as to the drafter’s 
intention from an uncertain premise we have found greater 
assistance in reaching our conclusion from considering the 
extent to which the meaning that is given to the words achieves 
or defeats the apparent scope and purpose of the 
legislation…word must take its colour, like a chameleon, from 
its setting and surrounds in the Act.109 
 The purposive approach is in line with South African Roman-Dutch law heritage. 
Roman-Dutch law jurists traditionally favoured a purposive approach to a literal approach 
when interpreting legislation. However, the purposive approach is not unproblematic. As 
Stinger points out: 
[t]he purpose or reason for an act, may itself be the subject of 
controversy no less difficult to resolve than the ultimate 
question of intent or meaning.110 
 Mureinik further points out that where the purpose of a statute is iniquitous, a 
purposive interpretation may promote an iniquitous result.111 The purposive approach, which 
although superior to the literal approach “fails to aspire to a higher coherence”.112 
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2.4 Teleological approach 
 Although the importance of context in interpreting legislation was recognised by SA 
academics before the advent of 1994, it was not until the introduction of the new 
constitutional order that courts applied a less formalistic purposive approach i.e. teleological 
approach. The teleological approach recognises the importance of an equitable interpretation 
when considering the purpose of legislation.  
 The Constitution mandates an approach to the interpretation of legislation that takes 
cognisance of constitutional values. Section 39(2) of the Constitution requires courts, 
tribunals or forums to promote the spirit purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights when 
“when interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary 
law.”113 The Constitution therefore necessitated the addition of an equitable element to the 
purposive approach, essentially transforming the purposive approach into a teleological 
theory.  
 According to Devenish a teleological approach has an ethical dimension and must be 
applied and construed wider than the purposive approach.114 He refers to the following words 
of Lord Denning to describe a teleological approach:  
[w]henever there is a choice, choose the meaning which accords 
with reason and justice.115 
 The teleological approach is not unlimited. As Driedger points out: 
[w]here the language of the legislature admits but one 
interpretation effect must be given to it whatever its 
consequences.116 
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 However, this statement should be qualified in light of the new constitutional order by 
adding the caveat, “provided the interpretation is not inconsistent with the Constitution and 
the Bill of Rights.”  
 In applying the teleological approach, there is a risk that the actual language used in 
the legislative provision might be completely disregarded in order to further the purpose of 
the legislation. Such a complete disregard for the purpose of legislative text by the judiciary 
would infringe on the legislator’s law making powers.117 Where the legislative text is not in 
furtherance of the purpose of the legislation or the values enunciated in the Bill of Rights, the 
correct avenue would be for the courts to declare the provision unconstitutional in terms of 
section 172 of the Constitution.118 Furthermore, an infidelity to the legislative text actually 
used by the legislator would result in legal uncertainty.119 
2.5 Savignian’s model – from Du Plessis’ perspective 
 The Savignian model was developed by Von Savigny to provide guidelines to 
interpreting pandectaerian Roman law.120 Although developed in 1840, the model takes into 
account the literal, purposive and teleological aspects of statutory interpretation. A slightly 
adapted Savignian model, comprising of five complementary, interrelated (and mostly 
overlapping) and practical techniques, is advocated by Du Plessis as a method of statutory 
interpretation in SA. These five techniques are elaborated on below. 
                                                             
117 The Doctrine of the Separation of Powers (“the doctrine”) is not explicitly acknowledged in the Constitution. 
It is, however, accepted that the doctrine is implicit in our Constitution’s design. Chaskalson P stated the 
following in South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath, 1 Butterworths Consitutional Law 
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that our Constitution provides for such a separation (of powers), and that laws inconsistent with what the 
Constitution requires in that regard are invalid”. 
118 Fourie and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another  1 All South African Law Reports 273, para 31 
(2005). 
119 Daniels v Campbell, 7 Butterworths Constitutional Law Reports 735, para 83 (2004). 
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62. 
28 
 
2.5.1 Grammatical technique 
 This technique recognises the importance of the language used in a provision and 
focusses on the ordinary rules of grammar and syntax in the interpretation of a provision.121 
The technique recognises the principle that every word is important and that courts should 
give effect to every word, unless the court is of the opinion that the word is superfluous in 
light of the purpose of the legislation. 122 Another important principle embedded in the 
technique is that word may not be added to or subtracted from legislative text.123 This rule is 
based on the separation of powers principle which determines that it is the legislator’s 
function to add or subtract words from the text and not the courts.124 However, this rule is 
again subject to the caveat that where the purpose of the legislation is clear and demands an 
addition or subtraction from the text, courts may add or subtract to ensure that the legislative 
text is in line with the legislator’s purpose.125 Therefore, according to Botha this technique 
does not symbolise a return to literalism, but merely takes note of the importance of the 
language used in legislation.126 
 The technique helps to limit the different meanings which could be attached to a 
provision by, for example, assuming that legislation is written in “ordinary language” and 
that technical language should be given a technical meaning.127 
 To contrast ordinary language, Du Plessis refers to formal language which he 
described as “artificial language”.128 An example would be, the International Accounting 
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Standards. It is created for the exclusive use of accountants and auditors and its meaning is 
closed. He further explains that legal language (in contrast to artificial language) is natural 
language, the meaning of which is constantly developing and expanding.129 
 A question that arises is at what time should the ordinary meaning of words in 
existing legislation be determined? A strict approach was followed in Finbro Furnishers 
(Pty) Ltd v Registrar of Deeds, Bloemfontein130 where the court held that words should be 
interpreted according to their meaning on the day the legislation was enacted. This decision, 
decided before the Constitution, was confirmed in 1999, after the advent of South Africa’s 
Constitutional Order in Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry v Swissborough Diamond 
Mines (Pty) Ltd.131 Botha opines that our courts may be less rigid in the future.132 He refers to 
Golden China TV Game Centre v Nintendo Co Ltd133 and the minority judgement in Fourie v 
Minister of Home Affairs,134 where both courts decided that legislation should be given an 
updated interpretation in light of the fact that the legislation operates in a continuing time-
frame. 135 
2.5.2 Contextual technique 
 This technique can be divided into two dimensions: the intra-textual dimension and 
the extra-textual dimension. In terms of the intra-textual dimension, the meaning of a 
provision should be considered in the context in which the specific legislative provision 
appears, as well as in terms of the legislative scheme as a whole.136  This allows courts to 
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consider the long title, pre-amble, headings, definition clauses, schedules etc. of legislation 
during the interpretation process.137  
 The extra-textual dimension, refers to the “environment” in which the legislative 
provision is framed.138 It refers to the social, political and economic context. 139 This allows a 
court to consider the Constitution, the Interpretation Act, the common law presumptions and 
canons of construction, etc.  
2.5.3 Value technique 
 This technique recognises the importance of the Constitution is statutory 
interpretation and is an embodiment of section 39(2) of the Constitution. It provides that the 
purpose of legislation should be established against the background of the Constitution’s 
values. This technique is essentially a manifestation of the teleological approach to 
interpretation and is best described by Sachs J in Coetzee v Government of the Republic of 
South Africa; Matiso v Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison:140 
In my view, faithfulness to the Constitution is best achieved by 
locating the two-stage balancing process within a holistic, 
value-based and case-oriented framework. The values that must 
suffuse the whole process are derived from the concept of an 
open and democratic society based on freedom and equality, 
several times referred to in the Constitution. The notion of an 
open and democratic society is thus not merely aspirational or 
decorative, it is normative, furnishing the matrix of ideals 
within which we work, the source from which we derive the 
principle and rules we apply, and the final measure we use for 
testing the legitimacy of impugned norms and conduct. If I may 
be forgiven the excursion, it seems to me that it also follows 
from the principles laid down in Makwanyane that we should 
not engage in purely formal or academic analyses, nor simply 
restrict ourselves to ad hoc technicism, but rather focus on what 
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has been called the synergetic relation between the value 
underlying the guarantees of fundamental rights and the 
circumstances of the particular case.141 (Own emphasis, 
footnotes omitted). 
 The technique links with the historical technique, because as Du Plessis states, the 
technique allows the court to look to the present and the future when interpreting legislation, 
but with an awareness of the lessons learnt from the past. 142  
2.5.4 Historical technique 
 The historical technique takes into account the factors which gave rise to the 
enactment of the legislation, as well as prior legislation. According to Du Plessis, this does 
not amount to a consideration of “historical facts”, but rather a consideration of the mischief 
toward which the legislation is aimed.143 Although an important factor, Botha stresses that the 
historical perspective cannot be decisive on its own. This is because legislation is designed to 
operate indefinitely and therefore “should be interpreted in the continuing time-frame”.144  
2.5.5 Comparative technique 
 This technique was not included by Von Savigny himself, but rather was added to the 
four techniques over time.145 This technique acknowledges that as an aid to interpretation, 
courts must consider international law and may turn to foreign law, when interpreting 
legislation. However, this does not mean that our courts are bound by the international law or 
foreign law they consider. As Chaskalson P said in S v Makwanyane146:  
we can derive assistance from public international law and 
foreign case law, but we are in no way bound to follow it.147 
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2.6 Conclusion 
 Wallis JA set out the current state of the law regarding the interpretation of statutes in 
Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality148. These principles are as 
follows:   
 As a starting point, when interpreting documents (including fiscal legislation), the 
meaning of words should be determined with reference to the language actually used.149 
 Consideration should be given to the ordinary grammatical meaning of the words used as 
well as the rules of syntax.150  
 The language used should be considered in the context in which a provision appears. 
 The apparent purpose of the provision should be established and taken into account when 
interpreting documents.151 
 If a word or provision is capable of more than one meaning, each meaning should be 
weighed in light of the above factors.152  
 The process is objective and not subjective.153 
 Judges must give effect to the sensible meaning as opposed to an insensible and 
unbusiness-like meaning.154  
 However, where the sensible and business-like meaning is not compatible with the 
language actually used, judges must refrain from substituting the words actually used 
with what they regard to be sensible and business-like.155  
 The principles enunciated by Wallis JA is similar to the techniques of the augmented 
Savigny model. However, Wallis JA did not emphasise that any interpretation must promote 
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the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights, therefore did not incorporate the value 
technique of the Savigny interpretation model. This is unfortunate, as the Savigny 
interpretation model provides a useful, systematic approach to the interpretation of statutes 
which takes cognisance of SA’s constitutional values. It combines the literal approach, 
purposive approach and teleological approach to facilitate a holistic and comprehensive 
process of statutory interpretation.  
 After a consideration of the current interpretation afforded in SA and Australia to the 
term “mining operations”, this study will apply the Savignian interpretation model to 
interpret the meaning of “mining operations” for SA income tax purposes.   
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CHAPTER 3: THE MEANING OF “MINING OPERATIONS” AND “MINERAL” IN 
AN SA TAX LAW CONTEXT 
3.1 Introduction 
 Section 1(1) of the ITA defines the term “mining operations” as follows:  
“mining operations and mining” include every method or 
process by which any mineral is won from the soil or from any 
substance or constituent thereof.  (Own emphasis.) 
 From the outset it is clear that the definition of “mining operations” is framed in very 
general terms. This is evident from the use of words such as “include”, “every” and “any”. At 
first glance, this would seem to suggest that a wide interpretation of “mining operations” 
should be followed. However, the interpreting the definition of “mining operations” is 
complicated by the central position held by the undefined term “mineral”. As will be 
elaborated on below, not only is the term “mineral” undefined, there is also no general 
accepted meaning of the term. This has resulted in differing interpretations, both broad and 
narrow, of the definition of “mining operations”.  
 This chapter will analyse the elements of the definition highlighted in the definition 
above in order to determine the interpretation to be given to the definition of “mining 
operations”. This chapter will further consider the narrow interpretation held by SARS and a 
wider view expressed in case law and by academic writers. Finally, this chapter concludes 
with a brief analysis of recent case law concerning the meaning of “mining operations”.  
3.2 “include”, “any” and “every” 
 The use of the word “include” in legislation has two possible purposes.156 Firstly, it 
can be used to expand the ordinary meaning of a term.157 This will normally be the case 
where the ordinary meaning of the term is well-known and the legislator wishes to indicate 
that the definition of the term for purposes of that legislation goes beyond that ordinary 
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meaning.158 Secondly, it can be used to indicate that the definition of the term in the 
legislation is exhaustive.159 In such a case, the word “includes” is used in place of the word 
“means” and it is accepted that the purpose is to make the ordinary meaning of the term clear 
and definite.160  
 The context in which the word “includes” is used will determine whether the 
definition of the term is meant to be exhaustive or to expand the ordinary meaning of the 
term.161 However, as noted in Jones & Co v CIR,162 “‘includes’ as a general rule, is not a term 
of exhaustive definition…as a general rule…it is a term of extension”.163 
 According to Innes JA in Hayne & Co v Kaffrarian Steam Mill Co Ltd164 the ordinary 
meaning of “any” is that it “is an indefinite term which includes all of the things to which it 
relates.”165 The word “any” has also been described as “a word of wide and unqualified 
generality”.166  
 Depending on the context, the word “every” can be synonymous to the word “any”.167 
This is supported by the definition of “every” in the Dictionary of Legal Words and 
Phrases168 which simply refers the reader back to every.169 The Oxford Dictionary of English 
defines “every” as a “determiner used before a singular noun to refer to all the individual 
members of a set without exception”.170 
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3.3 Mineral 
 The Oxford Dictionary of English defines mineral as “a solid, naturally occurring 
inorganic substance; a substance obtained by mining”, 171 whereas “mining” is defined as 
“the process of industry of obtaining coal or other minerals from a mine”.172  
 The term “mineral” is not defined in the ITA and it is generally accepted that the term 
“mineral” has no fixed ordinary meaning.  This is confirmed in the decision of Falcon 
Investments Ltd v CD of Birnam (Suburban) (Pty) Ltd,173 where Rumpff JA quoted the 
following passage from Halsbury’s Laws of England with approval: 
There is no general definition of the word ‘mineral’. The word 
is susceptible of expansion or limitation in meaning according 
to the intention with which it is used and the variety of 
meanings of which it admits is the source of all the difficulty in 
the attempts to frame any general definition. 
It is a question of fact whether in a particular case a substance is 
a mineral or not, and for this purpose instruments between 
private persons are subject to the same rules of construction as 
statutes. Regard must be had not only to the words employed to 
describe the substance in question, but also to the relative 
position of the parties interested, and to the substance of the 
transaction or arrangement which the instrument or statute 
embodies.  
The test of what is a mineral is what, at the date of the 
instrument in question, the word meant in the vernacular of the 
mining world, the commercial world, and among landowners, 
and in the case of conflict this meaning must prevail over a 
purely scientific meaning. There are, however, other 
circumstances to be taken into account. The intention with 
which the word is used may be inferred from the document 
itself or from consideration of the circumstances in which it was 
made.174  
  The flexibility of the meaning of the term “mineral” and its central position in the 
definition of “mining operations, makes the definition of “mining operations” not very 
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helpful in determining the scope of the 100% capital expenditure allowance. This, coupled 
with the general nature of the words used in the definition (i.e. “includes”, “every” and 
“any”) has further increased uncertainty surrounding the meaning of the definition of “mining 
operations”. This uncertainty is the cause of the differing interpretations of the definition of 
“mining operations”.  
3.4 A narrow view - SARS 
 SARS has adopted a narrow view which is set out in the draft IN. The draft IN has not 
been issued as final and the last due date for submissions was 30 April 2015.175 The stated 
purpose of the draft IN is to provide guidance on whether the extraction of certain substances, 
including clay and limestone, constitute “mining operations” for income tax purposes.176  
 In the draft IN, SARS refers to the historical purpose behind granting favourable tax 
concessions to the mining industry.177 SARS emphasises that the concessions were made in 
light of the high risk and high initial capital expenditure involved in the mining industry and 
to encourage the recovery of minerals through mining operations.178 Against this background, 
SARS follows a strict interpretation of the meaning of “mining operations” to ensure that the 
concessions are only available in respect of what it considers “actual” mining operations.179  
 SARS relies on the following statement in Western Platinum Ltd v CSARS180 to 
support its strict interpretation of “mining operations”:181 
The fiscus favours miners and farmers. Miners are permitted to 
deduct certain categories of capital expenditure from income 
derived from mining operations. Farmers are permitted to 
deduct certain defined items of capital expenditure from income 
derived from farming operations. These are class privileges. In 
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determining their extent, one adopts a strict construction of the 
empowering legislation. That is the golden rule laid down in 
Ernst v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1954 (1) SA 318 (A) 
at 323C-E and approved in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v 
D & N Promotions (Pty) Ltd 1995 (2) SA 296 (A) at 305A-B.182 
 SARS separates the definition of “mining operations” into four elements i.e.: 
 there must be a method or process; 
 by which any mineral; 
 is won; 
 from the soil or from any substance or constituent 
thereof.183 
 SARS takes a wide view on the meaning of “method” or “process” in the context of 
the definition of “mining operations”.184 SARS is of the view that, as long as the operations 
are toward the recovery of a mineral, whether quarrying or not, the operations will constitute 
“mining operations”.185 This view is supported by Van Blerk who argues that the general 
nature of words used in the definition of “mining operations” (i.e. “include”, “every” and 
“any”) make it irrelevant whether an operation constitutes quarrying (versus “mining’) or 
not.186 
 The draft IN does not analyse the meaning of the element “won”. SARS interprets the 
term soil in the last element (i.e “from the soil or from any substance or constituent thereof”) 
widely as meaning “earth”.187 SARS refers to the following comments made by Van Blerk:188 
The use of the word soil in the definition of mining operations is rather 
puzzling if one considers that the general description of ‘soil’ is the relatively 
thin upper layer of earth in which plants grow. Very few mining activities take 
place in soil and the only logical conclusion is that the term was intended to 
have the same meaning as the word earth which is generally used in other 
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definitions of the terms mine or mining, including the definition in the Sales 
Tax Act (see Appendix B).189  
“Constituent” is further interpreted to mean the waste removed through beneficiation in order 
to recover the mineral.190  
 With regard to the element “mineral”, SARS undertakes a detailed analysis of the 
term due to its central position in the definition of “mining operations”. This study will focus 
on SARS’ interpretation of the mineral-element and not the other three elements identified 
above. 
 In analysing the meaning of “mineral” SARS acknowledges that, as there is no 
definition of “mineral” in the ITA, the word “mineral” should be given its ordinary meaning 
in the context of the subject matter in which it is used.191 SARS refers to the ordinary 
dictionary meaning, the definition in the Mineral Petroleum Resources Development Act, No. 
28 of 2002 (“the MPRD Act”), case law and academic resources in an apparent attempt to 
support its narrow interpretation.192  
 Although SARS refers to the ordinary dictionary meaning of “mineral” it does not 
attempt to use this as justification for a narrow interpretation. This is probably because the 
ordinary dictionary meaning of “mineral” is framed broadly. In this regard, it is submitted 
that, with reference to the definition of “mining operations”, the emphasis should lie on the 
second part of the dictionary definition i.e. a mineral is “a substance obtained through 
mining”. 
 Further reference is made to two academic resources which define “mineral” i.e. the 
Dictionary of Mineral technology and Will’s Mineral Processing Technology.193 The 
common factor between the two definitions is that minerals are substances which are 
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homogeneous in composition, while substances such as rock are comprised of a variety of 
minerals and are found in large parts of the earth’s crust.194 The Dictionary of Mineral 
Technology195 distinguishes minerals from substances such as rock which may contain many 
minerals.196 In return, Will’s Mineral Processing Technology197 excludes clay from the 
definition of mineral based on the view that they are rocks and contain various minerals.198  
 In this regard it should be noted that although SA courts have in the past relied on 
evidence presented by geologists in determining the meaning of “mineral”,199 this is only to 
determine the scientific meaning of the term and the meaning attributed to “mineral” by our 
courts remains the decisive legal meaning.200 
  SARS further refers to the definition of “mineral” in section 1 to of the MPRD Act,201 
where “mineral” is defined to mean: 
… any substance, whether in solid, liquid or gaseous form, 
occurring naturally in or on the earth or in or under water and 
which was formed by or subjected to a geological process, and 
includes sand, stone, rock, gravel, clay, soil and any mineral 
occurring in residue stockpiles or in residue deposits, but 
excludes—  
(a) water, other than water taken from land or sea for the 
extraction of any mineral from such water;  
(b) petroleum; or  
(c) peat. (Own emphasis.) 
 As seen from the definition above, clay is specifically included in the definition of 
“minerals”. According to SARS the wide definition of “minerals” in the MPRD Act should 
be read in light of the legislative purpose of the MPRD Act compared to that of the ITA.202 
SARS states that the purpose of the MPRD Act is to provide fair access and promote the 
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sustainable development of SA’s mineral resources, while the purpose of the ITA is to collect 
taxes.203 It is SARS’ view that due to the differing legislative purposes behind the MPRD Act 
and the ITA, the definition of “minerals” in the MPRD Act cannot be used when interpreting 
the meaning of “mineral” for income tax purposes.204  
 Further reference is made to the obiter statement by Fletcher Moulton LJ in Great 
Western Railway Company v Carpalla United China Clay Company, Limited (“the Great 
Western Railway Case”):205 
If I were rash enough to venture a definition of ‘mineral’ I 
should say that it is any substance that can be got from within 
the surface of the earth which possesses a value in use, apart 
from its mere possession of bulk and weight which makes it 
occupy so much of the earth’s crust. …To dig out ballast and 
crushed stone and earth, a mere mixture of heterogeneous 
portions of the earth’s crust, for the purpose of making 
embankments, where the material goes from one position in the 
earth’s crust to another without modification or being submitted 
to any process of manufacture, does not seem to me to be 
making use of minerals, although no doubt the things you are 
handling were originally within the earth’s crust. Such materials 
have not a value in use apart from their bulk and weight, and 
they are only used as being capable of forming a portion of the 
earth’s crust in a new position. On the other hand, everything 
that has an individual value in use appears to me to be fairly 
called a mineral.206 
 It should be emphasised that it was not necessary for Fletcher Moulton LJ to define 
“minerals”, and he did not attempt to provide a conclusive definition of minerals. This is 
evident from the opening words of the paragraph above. Notwithstanding, this paragraph 
does provide a useful test to determine the meaning of “minerals”, i.e. the “value in use 
versus bulk” test. In terms of the “value in use versus bulk” test materials which have an 
individual value as opposed to a value when used in bulk, are considered to be minerals.207  
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 SARS is of the view that the “value in use versus bulk” test is only useful for the 
extraction of stone and sand which do not have an individual value.208 This view is due to 
SARS’ acknowledgement that clay and limestone do have individual value apart from their 
value in bulk.209 According to SARS the correct test for determining whether a substance 
extracted is a “mineral”, is whether the substance is extracted for its inherent mineralogical 
qualities as opposed to its physical properties.210 In this regard, SARS is of the view that, 
where a taxpayer extracts a substance for the purpose of recovering its constituent minerals, 
the extraction will constitute “mining operations”.211 
 SARS is further of the view that there is no scope to argue that clay used in 
brickmaking or limestone for building, road making, landscaping, construction or agricultural 
purposes are “minerals”.212 This is based on SARS view that in such cases, the clay and 
limestone is used not for its mineral content, but rather for its physical characteristics.213 
SARS does, however, note that clay, which is extracted for the purpose of recovering the 
mineral kaolin, or limestone, which is extracted for the purpose of recovering the mineral 
calcium carbonate, will constitute “minerals”.214  
 In the draft IN SARS considers the ordinary dictionary meaning of the terms “mining 
operations” and “minerals”. However, SARS does not attempt a grammatical analysis of 
these terms. This is probably so, because a grammatical analysis would support a wider 
interpretation of these terms. SARS further refers to the historical purpose behind the 
favourable tax dispensation applicable to “mining operations” but uses this purpose in 
support of its narrow interpretation by arguing that a narrow interpretation is needed to guard 
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against abuse by what SARS considers non-mining companies. No reference is made to an 
interpretation that promotes the spirit, purport and object of the Bill of Rights. SARS does 
consider foreign law (Australia) but does not purport to undertake a detailed analysis and 
comparison between the foreign law considered and SA law.  
 In light of the above, it is submitted that SARS interpretation approach most likely 
falls under the umbrella of a purposive approach to interpretation (albeit a flawed one). It is 
submitted that SARS, facing pressure from Treasury to increase its tax revenues, failed to 
take sufficient cognisance of the purpose behind granting the 100% capital expenditure 
allowance to the “mining industry”. 
3.5 A wider view  
 In Income Tax Case, No. 909215 Nyasaland Quarries and Mining Co Ltd 
(“Nyasaland”) quarried a gneiss which was crushed and screened to use in the manufacture of 
concrete.216 The rock was extracted through surface works by drilling and blasting.217 
Nyasaland conceded that it could not be said to be carrying on “mining operations” in 
common parlance.218 However, Nyasaland submitted that this was not the question before the 
court.219 Rather the question is whether Nyasaland is carrying on “mining operations” as 
defined in section 2 of the Federal Income Tax Act, No. 16 of 1954 of Nyasaland (“the 
FITA”).220 This definition of “mining operations” in the FITA is substantially the same as the 
definition in the ITA and reads as follows: 
“Mining operations” and “mining” include every method or process by which 
any mineral is won from the soil or any substance or constituent thereof. 
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 With regard to the meaning of the term “mineral” as used in the above definition the 
court applied the “value in use versus bulk” test:  
[T]he word mineral as used in the definition of 'mining operations' and 
'mining' is used in the sense of any substance that can be got from within the 
surface of the earth which possesses a value in use, apart from its mere 
possession of the bulk and weight which makes it occupy so much of the 
earth's crust, and on the evidence I am satisfied that the stone quarried by the 
appellant has such an individual value in use.221 
 The court further held there is nothing in the FITA which indicated that it was the 
legislator’s intention to exclude the Nyasaland’s type of quarrying operations from the 
definition of “mining operations” and upheld the taxpayer’s appeal.222  
 The Collector of Taxes (“the COT”) appealed to the High Court of Nyasaland (“the 
HC”) arguing that gneiss is not a “mineral” and therefore not conducting “mining operations” 
as defined in the FITA.223 On appeal the HC held that the term “mining operations”, as 
defined in the FITA, is wider than the ordinary meaning of the term: 
In Craies on Statute Law (5th ed., p. 197) it is stated that there are in statutes 
two forms of interpretation clause. In one, where the word defined is declared 
to mean so and so the definition is explanatory and prima facie restrictive. In 
the other, where the word defined is declared to include so and so, the 
definition is extensive. It is to be observed that in the various definitions 
contained in section 2 of the Income Tax Act, some of the clauses use the 
words ‘means’ and other the word ‘include’, so that the choice of words must 
be deliberate. In my opinion there can be no doubt whatever that in defining 
the expressions ‘mining operations’ and ‘mining’ as it has done, the legislature 
intended to give these expressions, when used elsewhere in the Act, a meaning 
wider than the ordinary everyday meaning of those terms. Moreover, the 
extension of the usual meaning of those expressions is obviously intended to 
be a wide one, for the words used are very general. ‘Mining operations’ and 
‘mining’ are to include every method or process by which any mineral is won. 
It is hardly possible to imagine more general words.224 (Own emphasis.) 
The HC expressed the view that the deliberate extension of the meaning of “mining 
operations” beyond its ordinary meaning points to the intention of the legislator to extend the 
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100% capital expenditure allowance to quarrying operations which would not be covered by 
the ordinary meaning of “mining operations”.225  
 The HC further approved of the court a quo’s application of the definition of mineral 
in the Great Western Railway case holding that “[t]his broad definition appears nowhere to 
have been overruled or criticized and seems to me to be as good a definition as can be 
found.”226 The HC held that, in applying this broad definition to the term “mineral” as used in 
the definition of “mining operations” in FITA, gneiss is a “mineral”.227  
 It was further argued on behalf of the COT that the court a quo erred in holding that 
the quarrying of gneiss for roadworks constituted the extraction of a mineral.228 According to 
the COT, the gneiss had no individual value in use as the taxpayer was merely moving parts 
of the earth from one place to another.229 The HC pointed out that this contention is 
incorrect.230 The court a quo found that the gneiss was used for roadworks, concrete, gardens 
paths and so forth.231 The HC further pointed out that the taxpayer subjected the gneiss to a 
process of manufacture in order to make the gneiss suitable for use in the above purposes and 
therefore it could not be said that the taxpayer was merely moving a part of the earth’s crust 
from one place to another.232 Based on this the HC dismissed the COT’s appeal.233  
 According to Van Blerk, given the Judgement in COT v Nyasaland Quarries and 
Mining Company Ltd,234 “minerals” must be interpreted fairly widely.235 Van Blerk adapts 
the definition of “minerals” from the Great Western Railway case (quoted with approval in 
Nyasaland Quarries case) to provide the following useful definition of the term: 
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A mineral is any substance that can be got from within the 
surface of the earth which possesses a value in use apart from 
its mere possession of bulk and weight.236 
 Van Blerk also lists case law where clay and limestone were either held to be minerals 
or not.237 However, as rightly mentioned by Van Blerk, the list does not take into account the 
context of the cases and these cases were not decided under the ITA or another act with a 
similar definition of “mining operations”.238 For that reason, this study will not consider the 
meaning attributed to “mineral” and “mining operations” in these cases. 
  A wider interpretation of the word “minerals” is also followed by Meyerowitz and 
Spiro who submit that “it is not only rock but also ground or sand used for industrial purpose 
or even for road building, (that) falls within the term mineral for the purposes of the Income 
Tax Act.”239 
3.6 Recent jurisprudence on the meaning of “mining operations” - The Foskor case 
(2010) and the Marula Platinum case (2016)  
 In both the CSARS v Foskor (Pty) Ltd (“the Foskor case”)240 and the CSARS v Marula 
Platinum Mines Ltd (“the Marula Platinum case”)241 the court was called upon to consider 
the distinction between “mining operations” and manufacturing. This distinction determines 
where “mining operations” end and the manufacturing process begins. It is therefore relevant 
in determining what taxation formula should be applied, and specifically, the capital 
allowances available to the taxpayer. While this distinction falls outside the scope of this 
study, the comments made by the courts in the Foskor case and the Marula Platinum case as 
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regard to the meaning of “mining operations” has fuelled uncertainty surrounding the 
interpretation of this phrase and thus deserve consideration. 
3.6.1 The Foskor case 
 In Income Tax Case, No. 1836242 the issue was whether the mineral ore extracted by 
Foskor (Pty) Ltd (“Foskor”) constitutes “trading stock”.243 “Trading stock” is defined in 
section 1(1) of the ITA as follows: 
(a) includes – 
(i) anything produced, manufactured, constructed, assembled, 
purchased or in any other manner acquired by the taxpayer for the 
purpose of manufacture, sale or exchange by the taxpayer or on behalf 
of the taxpayer; 
(ii) anything the proceeds from the disposal of which forms or will 
form part of the taxpayer’s gross income…(Own emphasis.) 
 Relevant to the determination of whether the mineral ore extracted by Foskor 
constitutes “trading stock” is the distinction between “mining operations” and manufacturing. 
The Gauteng Tax Court (“GTC”) held the following with regard to Foskor’s operations: 
the essence of the aforementioned processes is the extraction or winning of the 
phosphates, without a different finished product emerging. What is sold to 
customers is the phosphates originally found in the phosphate-bearing ore, and 
that no different substance with different qualities has been produced. All that 
occurs is a process which liberates the mineral particles from the ore and 
which separates the mineral particles.244  
Based on this the GTC concluded that as the phosphates occur naturally in the earth it is 
mined and not manufactured.245 The SCA disagreed with the GTC holding: 
In my view, the submission that the phosphate minerals that occur naturally in 
the earth are contained in what is sold to fertilizer producers worldwide and 
that the end product was therefore not manufactured, is too simplistic. It 
ignores not only the complexity of the processes to which the ore was 
subjected but the fact that in the result several minerals are separated and sold 
independently. It also ignores the fact that before the process referred to the 
ore is not saleable but that what is produced thereafter has a worldwide 
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market. Put simply, the end products that emerge after the processes referred 
to above are significantly different from the raw ore.246 
 There are several problems with the SCA’s judgement. Firstly the view expressed by 
the SCA is based on the erroneous assumption that minerals are contained in neat pockets in 
the earth.247 This is easily disproved. A company mining for platinum will not only extract 
platinum but also palladium, gold, rhodium, osmium, rhenium, iridium and ruthenium.248 
Secondly, the effect of the SCA’s judgement is that for trading stock purposes Foskor’s 
operations will be treated as a manufacturing process, but as “mining operations” for all other 
provisions in the ITA.249 Thirdly, the SCA’s judgement is based on the decision in Richards 
Bay Iron & Titanium (Pty) Ltd & another v Commissioner for Inland Revenue (“the Richards 
Bay Iron case”).250 According to the SCA the main issue in the Richards Bay Iron case 
concerned whether the stockpiles were “manufactured” (and not mined), however, the parties 
in the Richards Bay Iron case never sought to distinguish between “mining operations” and 
manufacturing.251 Instead, it was conceded by the parties that the stockpiles formed part of 
the manufacturing process.252 The decision in the Richards Bay Iron case is therefore 
irrelevant to the facts in the Foskor case. 
3.6.2 The Marula Platinum case 
 In Income Tax Case, No. 1875253 the main question before the court was whether 
section 23F(2)254 of the ITA applied.255 If so, the benefits claimed by the taxpayer, Marula 
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Platinum Mines Ltd (“the taxpayer”), in terms of sections 11(a) and 24M of the ITA would 
be nullified.256   
  The taxpayer operates a mine from which it extracts ore from the surface.257 The 
taxpayer’s operations consist of two phases.258 During Phase 1 the taxpayer extracts ore 
containing platinum, palladium, gold, rhodium, iridium ruthenium, nickel, copper and 
cobalt.259 During Phase 2 the ore is smelted to extract the mineral elements and produce a 
powder concrete.260 The taxpayer does not own the mine and does not sell the mineral ore it 
extracts in Phase 1. Instead, the taxpayer sells the powder concrete resulting from Phase 2, to 
a fellow subsidiary.261 The taxpayer deducted the full amount of expenditure incurred in 
terms of section 11(a), but only included the amounts which accrued to him in terms of 
section 24M.262 The taxpayer argued that nothing should be recouped in terms of section 
23F(2) as the mineral ore does not constitute “trading stock” as it was never “acquired” by 
the taxpayer (as is required in terms of the definition of “trading stock” in section 1(1) of the 
ITA).263 The GTC agreed that with regard to Phase 1, the taxpayer merely took possession of 
the mineral ore and never acquired it and therefore section 23F(2) cannot apply.264  
 Following this, the Commissioner for SARS (“CSARS”) tried to bring the taxpayer’s 
operations into the definition of “trading stock” by arguing that the Phase 1 and Phase 2 
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constituted a process of manufacture.265 The GTC disagreed with the CSARS holding that 
both Phase 1 and Phase 2 constitute “mining operations”.266 However, during Phase 2 the 
GTC held that the mineral ore is transformed into concentrate with a higher value and that the 
requirement of “acquisition” was also met.267 Therefore it was held that the concentrate 
constitutes trading stock and CSARS could recoup the deductions applicable to Phase 2 in 
terms of section 23F(2).268  
 CSARS appealed to the SCA. On appeal the main issue was whether the taxpayer’s 
operations constituted a manufacturing process and therefore amounted to “trading stock” as 
defined in section 1(1) of the ITA.269 The taxpayer argued that the processes were not that of 
manufacturing but rather constituted “mining operations” as defined in section 1(1) of the 
ITA.270  
 The SCA agreed with CSARS that the process was one of manufacture and not 
mining holding that: 
Whilst the ITA does not define manufacturing, mining is defined as including 
‘every method or process by which any mineral is won from the soil or from 
any substance or constituent thereof’. In my view (the taxpayer’s) submission 
fails to take proper account of the fact that Marula extracted the ore from the 
land for the purpose of utilising it to render an end product in the form of a 
concentrate. The ore was not intended to be disposed of in its original state, 
and was subjected to an intricate process, described above, which rendered an 
end product that was not only significantly different from the raw ore, but was 
a highly valuable commodity saleable on the open market. Seen in this 
context, the processes utilised by Marula to derive the concentrate from the 
raw ore, did not constitute the ‘mining’ of the concentrate, but its manufacture 
as was held in analogous circumstances in Richards Bay and Foskor.271 
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 Based on this the SCA found that CSARS could recoup the deductions in both Phase 
1 and 2.272 
 The judgement in the Marula Platinum case sparks the uncertainty toward the 
interpretation of “mining operations”.273 Ostensibly, the SCA is of the view that the correct 
test for determining whether a taxpayer is conducting “mining operations” is whether the ore 
is disposed of in its original state. There is no basis in the definition of “mining operations” 
for this conclusion. Further, it is common parlance that the extraction of minerals necessarily 
involves their separation from their ore and this separation forms an integral part of the 
mining process.  
 Although the judgement only purports to deal with deductions covered by section 
23F(2) i.e. section 11(a) deductions, there is a concern that the application of the judgement 
may be extended to other provisions of the ITA, specifically the capital allowances.274  
 In any event, it was arguably not necessary for the SCA to pronounce on the meaning 
of “mining operations”.275 Instead, the concentrate could have been brought into the 
definition of “trading stock” under para (a)(ii) as the proceeds from the disposal of the 
concentrate would form part of Marula Platinum’s gross income.276 However, Marula 
Platinum argued against such an inclusion on the basis that Marula Platinum was conducting 
“mining operations”.277 It is thought that the SCA merely considered the meaning of “mining 
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operations” in order to counter this argument, and the SCA’s judgement should not be seen as 
creating precedent as regard to the meaning of “mining operations”.278 
3.7 Conclusion 
 As seen from the discussion above, there is no legal certainty on how the definition of 
“mining operations” in the ITA should be interpreted. While SARS follows a narrow view, a 
wider interpretation is followed in the Nyasaland Quarries case and by academic writers. The 
considerable lack of SA jurisprudence dealing authoritatively with the interpretation of 
“mining operations” results in further legal uncertainty which has been aggravated by the 
recent decisions in the Foskor case and the Marula Platinum case.  
 Taxpayers conducting mining operations are now in an untenable position with regard 
to the tax treatment of capital expenditure incurred. There is a risk, in light of the Foskor case 
and Marula Platinum case that part of the operations which were anticipated to be “mining 
operations” are now classified by SARS as manufacturing operations. This will result in 
capital expenditure being claimable over a period of four or five years instead of 100% in 
year one. This could further lead to the re-characterisation of mining income as non-mining 
income, resulting in capital expenditure not being deductible against the re-characterised 
income. Given SARS’ aggressive stance toward applying understatement penalties in such 
cases, certainty as regard to the meaning of “mining operations” has become paramount to 
mining companies.  
 In light of the need for certainty surrounding the interpretation of the term “mining 
operations”, the position in Australia will be considered in order to determine whether 
Australian jurisprudence could provide useful guidelines to interpreted “mining operations” 
for SA income tax purposes.   
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CHAPTER 4: DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL JURISPRUDENCE IN AUSTRALIA 
RELATING TO THE MEANING OF “MINING OPERATIONS” AND “MINERALS” 
4.1 Introduction 
 The Australian Income Tax Assessment Act, No. 38 of 1997 (“the AITAA”) and the 
Customs Act refer to the terms “mining operations”. Uncertainty surrounding the 
interpretation of this term have been the subject of many disputes before the AAT, the High 
Court of Australia (“HCA”) and the Federal Court of Australia (“FCA”). This has resulted in 
a rich body of jurisprudence on the interpretation of the term “mining operations” which will 
be considered in detail below. 
4.2 Income Tax  
 Subdivision 40-H of the AITAA provides for a 100% capital expenditure allowance 
for capital expenditure incurred on  
 exploration or prospecting; 
 mining and quarrying site rehabilitation; 
 the payment of petroleum resource rent tax; and  
 environmental protection activities.  
 To qualify for the 100% capital expenditure allowance the taxpayer must carry on 
“mining operations”. “Mining operations” is a defined term in the AITAA. The definition 
reads as follows: 
“Mining operations” means mining operations on a mining 
property for extracting minerals (except petroleum) from their 
natural site… 
The term minerals, also central to the definition of “mining operations” is not 
defined in the AITAA.  
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 The predecessor to the AITAA, the Income Tax and Social Services Contribution 
Assessment Act 1936-1952 (the ITSSCAA”), provided a much more generous 100% capital 
expenditure allowance, similar to the ITA. Sections 122(1) and 122A provided the taxpayer 
with an election to deduct the full amount of capital expenditure incurred in connection with 
“mining operations upon a mining property”, in the year during which the expenditure was 
incurred. However, unlike the AITAA and the ITA, the ITSSCAA did not define “mining 
operations”. The ITSSCAA furthermore, like the AITAA and the ITA, also did not define 
“minerals”.  
 For purposes of this study two important cases were decided under the ITSSCAA on 
the interpretation of “mining operations” and “mineral” for income tax purposes:  New South 
Wales Associated Blue Metal Quarries Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (“the NSW 
case”)279 and North Australian Cement v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (“the North 
Australian Cement case”)280. 
4.2.1 The NSW case 
 In the NSW case New South Wales Associated Blue Metal Quarries Ltd (“NSW”) 
exercised the election in terms of section 122(1) read with section 122A of the ITSSCAA to 
deduct certain capital expenditure it incurred during the extraction of blue-metal.281 The only 
question before the HCA was whether NSW carried on “mining operations upon a mining 
property”.282  
 The HCA followed a two-phased approach to determine whether NSW carried on 
“mining operations upon a mining property”, considering firstly, the nature of the substance 
extracted by NSW and secondly, the manner in which NSW extracts the said substance. It 
                                                             
279 New South Wales Associated Blue-Metal Quarries Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, 94 
Commonwealth Law Reports 509 (1956). 
280 North Australian Cement Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, 20 Australian Tax Reports 1058 (1989). 
281 New South Wales Associated Blue-Metal Quarries Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, 511. 
282 Ibid. 
55 
 
was found that NSW extracts basalts or dolerite, commonly known as blue metal or 
bluestone.283 The HCA further found that blue metal is normally won through open-cast 
workings (commonly known as “quarrying”) and not from subterranean workings (commonly 
known as “mining”).284 This, NSW argued, is irrelevant in determining whether NSW’s 
activities constitute “mining operations”.285 More and more, it was argued, technology has 
allowed open-cast workings to replace subterranean workings, however, the purpose of 
workings were the same and the equipment used remained substantially the same.286  
 With regard to the meaning of the word “mining” the court said the following: 
The meaning of the words “mine” and “mining” like the word 
“minerals” is by no means fixed and is readily controlled by 
context and subject matter. Few words have occasioned the 
courts more difficulty than “minerals”, but in some degree that 
is because in legal instruments it is seldom, if ever, used in its 
accurate or scientific sense and yet the word possesses no 
secondary meaning at once accepted and definite. No doubt the 
word “mine” has also proved a source of difficulty, but the 
difficulties have been fewer and perhaps less persistent. The 
word seems always to have been somewhat indefinite in its 
application. Judicially, however, its primary meaning 
unaffected by context is taken to refer to underground workings 
and not open-cast workings or quarrying.287 (Own emphasis.) 
 The HCA found it conclusive that blue metal was always extracted through open-cast 
workings and that no-one in Australia speaks of a blue-metal mine or of a blue-metal quarry 
as “mining property”.288 Therefore, it was held that NSW’s operations did not constitute 
“mining operations upon a mining property”.289  
 Although the HCA applied a narrow interpretation to the term “mining operations”, it 
is submitted that the HCA did not purport to lay down a general rule that the extraction of 
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substances through open-cast workings would never constitute “mining operations”. This is 
supported in the decision of the court a quo per Kitto J, where he expressed the view that it 
would not be unreasonable to hold that the extraction of blue metal constitutes mining, but 
that in NSW’s case it would unnaturally stretch the language to hold that NSW’s extraction 
of blue metal constitutes “mining operations”.290 Furthermore, the HCA referred with 
approval to cases where it was said that the extraction of gold through open-cast workings 
would never be called a gold quarry.291 Rather it would naturally be called a gold mine.292 
According to the HCA, this is because traditionally gold is recovered through subterranean 
workings and therefore the extraction of gold has become associated with the process of 
mining.293 
4.2.2 The North Australian Cement case 
 In the North Australian Cement case the FCA had to decide whether North Australian 
Cement Ltd (“NACL”) was carrying on “mining operations” as envisaged in section 122(1) 
of the ITSSCAA.294  In this regard, based on the decision in the NSW case, NACL’s main 
argument was that it would not be an unnatural stretch of language to describe its operations 
as “mining operations”.295  
 The FCA proceeded to consider what is meant by “mining operations” in section 
122(1) of the ITSSCAA, confirming that the section refers to the phrase “mining operations 
on a mining property” in its ordinary sense and not any technical sense.296  The FCA quoted 
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with approval case law297 where it was held that the ordinary meaning of “mining operations” 
is “flexible rather than fixed”, allowing the phrase to accommodate technological change.298 
Based on this, the FCA held that ordinary usage of the phrase must be determined at the time 
the capital expenditure was incurred.299 It was further held that although scientific and 
professional terminology may be relevant, it cannot be decisive.300   
 According to the FCA, the is the “informed general usage” test, as applied by the 
court a quo, is the correct test to determine whether NACL is conducting “mining 
operations”.301 The informed general usage test considers the “way in which the deposits 
occur, the character of the material recovered and the use to which it may reasonably put”302 
in order to determine whether a taxpayer is conducting “mining operations”.303  
 On the facts the FCA found that NACL extracts limestone for the manufacture of 
cement and that none of the limestone extracted was used as stone for building or 
agriculture.304 The FCA applied the informed general usage test and found that NACL 
extracted limestone for its chemical qualities to use for the manufacture of cement as opposed 
to limestone extracted for its physical attributes to use as building materials or in 
agriculture.305 The FCA finally held that it would not be a stretch of the language to describe 
NACL’s operations as “mining operations” and not quarrying operations.306 Conclusive to the 
FCA’s decision was the view that the phrase “quarrying operations” is normally used to 
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obtain materials in bulk for their physical attributes, while the phrase “mining operations” is 
normally used to describe the extraction of a substance for its chemical qualities.307  
 The North Australian Cement case is the locus classicus on the application of the 
informed general usage in determining the meaning of “mining operations” in the context of 
the ITSSCAA where “mining operations” is not a defined term. However, as will be seen 
below, the application of the informed general usage test has been extended to the Customs 
Act which does contain a definition of “mining operations”. 
4.3 Customs Act: Pre-1995 
 In 1982, a new section 164 was inserted in the Customs Act which introduced the 
Diesel Fuel Rebate (“DFR”) scheme in terms of which a DFR would be paid for expenditure 
on fuel used in “mining operations”. Section 164(7) defined “mining operations” (until 1997) 
as follows: 
“mining operations” means-  
(a) exploration, prospecting or mining for minerals; or 
(b) the dressing or beneficiation (at the mining site or 
elsewhere) of minerals, or 
ores bearing minerals, as an integral part of operations for their 
recovery, 
and includes  - 
… 
but does not include quarrying operations carried on for the sole 
purpose of obtaining stone for building, road making or similar 
purposes. (Own emphasis.) 
The core part of the definition of mining operations is “mining for minerals”.308 Section 
164(7) further defined “minerals” (until 1995) as follows: 
“minerals” means minerals in any form, whether solid, liquid 
or gaseous and whether organic or inorganic. 
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 Three important judgements were decided in terms of the definitions of “mining 
operations” and “minerals” as they stood up until 1995: Re Collector of Customs v Bell Basic 
Industries Ltd (“the Bell case”),309 Collector of Customs v Neumann Sands (Victoria) (Pty) 
Ltd (“the Neumann Sands case”)310 and Re Water Authority of Western Australia and 
Collector of Customs (“the Water Authority case”).311 
4.3.1 The Bell case 
 In the Bell case the question before the FCA was whether Bell Basic Industries Ltd 
(“Bell Basic Industries”) was conducting “mining operations” as defined in section 164(7) of 
the Customs Act and qualified for the DFR for diesel fuel used in said “mining operations”. 
 The facts of the Bell case were as follows: Bell Basic Industries extracts a stone called 
black granite for another company called Black Granite (Pty) Ltd.312 Although geologically 
the stone is known as dolerite, black granite is a scarce resource, holding particular aesthetic 
interest thereby increasing demand for its use in cladding in building and use as monumental 
stone.313 At the time of the Bell case, unpolished slabs of black granite sold for about $4000 
per cubic meter.314 Extracting black granite without damaging the valuable stone requires 
specialised equipment, extraction methods and skill.315  
 Bell Basic Industries applied for the DFR for diesel fuel used in the extraction of 
black granite. The Collector of Customs refused the DFR application by Bell Basic Industries 
contending that black granite is not a “mineral” and therefore, Bell Basic Industries’ 
extracting operations do not constitute “mining for minerals”.  
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 The FCA, in considering the meaning of “minerals” held that, given the generality of 
the definition of “minerals” in the Customs Act and the inclusion of “gaseous” in the 
definition, any substance which by informed general usage is seen as a mineral was intended 
by the legislature to be covered by the definition of “minerals”.316 This is so, it was held, even 
though such substance might not be a mineral in the scientific sense.317 Based on this the 
FCA found no reason to disturb the AAT’s finding that black granite was a mineral.318  
 The FCA further considered whether Bell Basic Industries’ operations could be 
described as “mining for minerals”.319 The FCA agreed with the reasoning of the AAT that 
commercially, Bell Basic Industries’ operations constitute “mining”.320 The AAT based its 
decision on the fact that specialised methods and equipment are required to remove the large 
overburden to extract black granite.321 This, the AAT found, is very different from extracting 
common dolerite.322 Furthermore, the AAT held that, at the time of extraction of the black 
granite, it was common in Australia to speak of such extraction operations as “mining 
operations” and not “quarrying operations”.323 The FCA agreed with the AAT’s reasoning 
confirming that Bell Basic Industries was “mining for minerals” and dismissed the appeal by 
the Collector of Customs.324   
 The FCA in the Bell case confirmed that the informed general usage test (as 
established in the context of the ITSCCAA in the North Australian Cement case) may be 
applied in the context of the Customs Act.  
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4.3.2 The Neumann Sands case 
 In the Neumann Sands case, the question before the FCA was whether Neumann 
Sands’ sand dredging operations constituted “mining operations” as defined in section 
164(7).325 Specifically, the FCA had to decide whether Neumann Sands was “mining for 
minerals” as contemplated in paragraph (a) of the aforementioned definition.326  
 The Neumann Sand’s case was heard as an appeal by the Collector of Customs from 
the decision of the AAT. The AAT and made the following findings: 
 Neumann Sands extracted sand for industrial purposes to use in concrete 
manufacture.327  
 Neumann Sands requires that the sand constitute 90% silica (an industrial mineral) 
and be free from lignite.328  
 Neumann Sands carried out extensive tests to ensure that the sand extracted met the 
Australian standard.329 
 The methods used by Neumann Sands to extract the sand could properly be described 
as mining.330 
 Based on the above findings the AAT held that Neumann Sands was “mining for 
minerals” as contemplated in the definition of “mining operations” in section 164(7)(a) of the 
Customs Act.331  
 On appeal the Collector of Customs contended that the AAT made an error in law by 
applying the following test laid down in Boral Bricks (QLD) Ltd v Australian Customs 
Service (“the Boral Bricks case”):332 
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Whilst the definition imposes a purposive test; the legislation 
does not by its combined effect mean that rebate is payable only 
to persons or companies whose operations are designed to win 
material from which will be extracted raw minerals. The rebate 
is also payable where the mining operations result in the 
winning of a product, the end use of which is dependent upon, 
inter alia perhaps, its mineral content. That the operator does 
not in advance, by chemical testing or otherwise, place himself 
in the position of being able to give a specific and detailed 
identity to that content, does not mean that his operations are 
outside the scope of legislation.333 (Own emphasis.) 
 The Collector of Customs contended that the “statutory test is whether the relevant 
operations are mining for minerals and not whether the operations are ones which result in 
the mining of a product the end use of which is dependent upon, amongst other things, its 
mineral content.”334 In this regard the FCA held that it is not necessary to consider whether 
the test formulated in the Boral Bricks case is correct or not.335 This is so because the 
reasoning of the AAT is based on the informed general usage test as formulated in the North 
Australian Cement case.336 This is evident from the following statement by the AAT “we 
must look at the way in which the sand occurs, its character and the use to which it may be 
reasonably put”.337  
 The FCA further confirmed the finding in the Bell case that the mere fact that the 
informed general usage test was formulated in the North Australian Cement case in the 
context of the ITSSCAA and not the Customs Act, does not make the application thereof in 
the context of the Customs Act in the Neumann Sands case erroneous in law.338  
 In this regard it should be noted that, unlike in SA, the distinction between questions 
of fact and questions of law remain relevant in Australia. The FCA will only overturn a 
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decision by the AAT if the AAT made an error of law.339 Importantly, an incorrect finding of 
fact does not constitute an error of law.340 Therefore, as there was no error of law, the FCA 
dismissed the appeal from the Collector of Customs on the basis that the decision of the AAT 
was not reasonably open to question.341  
4.3.3 The Water Authority case 
 The Water Authority of Western Australia (“the Water Authority”) uses diesel fuel in 
extracting groundwater from under the ground and pumping it into storage.342 Either just 
before storage, or just after pumping the groundwater into storage, the Water Authority adds 
chlorine to the extracted water.343 The Collector of Customs refused the Water Authority’s 
DFR application for the diesel fuel used in extracting the water from underground. Water 
Authority appealed the Collector of Customs’ decision. On appeal, the AAT had to decide 
three questions: 
1. Whether Water Authority is extracting a “mineral” as defined in section 164(7) of the 
Customs Act?344 
2. Whether Water Authority is “mining”?345 
3. And if so, whether Water Authority could be said to be “mining for minerals” as 
contemplated in the definition of “mining operations” in section 164(7)(a). According 
to the AAT the third question must be answered by applying the “characterisation 
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test”, outlined in Neumann Dredging Co Ltd (trading as Neumann Contractors) v 
Collector of Customs (QLD).346 
 On the first question, the Water Authority and the Collector of Customs accepted that 
groundwater is a “mineral” for purposes of the definition in section 164(7) of the Customs 
Act.347 With regard to the second question, the ATT held that as the mining industry regards 
the extraction of underground water through “pumping”, as “mining”, it was satisfied that 
Water Authority is “mining” for purposes of section 164(7) of the Customs Act.348  
 The remaining question for the AAT to decide was whether Water Authority’s 
operations satisfied the characterisation test.  In terms of the characterisation test, Water 
Authority will only qualify for the DFR if it is evident that Water Authority’s purpose in 
conducting its operations is to extract the mineral, groundwater349. The Collector of Customs 
contended that Water Authority’s purpose in conducting its operations was to provide the 
community with water and not to extract the mineral, groundwater.350 
 The AAT was satisfied that Water Authority’s purpose in conducting its operations 
was to extract the mineral, groundwater. The AAT further found that no diesel fuel was used 
to add chlorine into the water, however, in some cases, the diesel fuel was used to pump 
groundwater which had already been chlorinated. Therefore, the only further question was 
whether the addition of chlorine altered the character of Water Authority’s operations 
 In answering this question the court referred to the following paragraph in Abbott 
Point Bulk Coal Pty Ltd v Collector of Customs (“the Abbott case”):351 
Whether an activity falls within the definition of 'mining 
operations' as defined in s.164(7) of the Customs Act 1901 is a 
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question of fact. So too is the question of when recovery is 
complete. In each case a commonsense and commercial 
approach has to be taken to the question having regard to the 
evident purpose of the legislation, to make rebates available to 
promote the exploitation of mineral deposits in Australia. 
However, a point is reached where the mineral has been 
recovered and what is done with it thereafter is the use or 
processing of it for its better use as a mineral... The process of 
recovery includes, in our view, those steps which are taken by a 
miner before sale, by whatever process, to remove the mineral 
from that in which it is embedded or with which it is 
intermixed. Such a process comprehends the refining of 
minerals or ore to remove impurities naturally occurring in the 
material as it has been mined. Once the process of separation or 
refining has been completed, to subject the mineral product to a 
process or procedure designed purely to facilitate its better use 
as so separated or refined or to render it more readily or 
advantageously marketable is not in our view part of the 
recovery process.352 (Own emphasis.) 
 The AAT found that the recovery process ended when the groundwater was pumped 
into storage and that as the addition of chlorine after storage does not use diesel fuel it does 
not change the character of Water Authority’s activities as mining for “minerals”. The AAT 
further found, in line with the Abbott case, that where chlorine is added before storage and 
chlorinated water is pumped using diesel fuel, Water Authority’s operations still constitute 
“mining for minerals”. Based on this, the AAT held that Water Authority is entitled to the 
DFR for diesel fuel used in extracting groundwater.  
 The AAT in the Water Authority case did not refer to the informed general usage test. 
Rather, the AAT applied a purposive test in terms of which the purpose of the DFR applicant 
in extracting the substance is decisive. In this regard, where the purpose of the DFR applicant 
is to extract a mineral, the DFR applicant will be considered to be “mining for minerals” and 
therefore conducting “mining operations”.  
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4.4 Customs Act: Post-1995 
 In 1995, the definition of “minerals” in the Customs Act was amended as follows: 
“minerals” means minerals in any form, whether solid, liquid 
or gaseous and whether organic or inorganic, except: 
(a) sand, sandstone, oil, slate, clay (other than bentonite or 
kaolin), basalt, granite, gravel, water; or 
(b) limestone (other than agricultural use limestone) 
(Own emphasis.) 
 Clause 3 of the Explanatory Memorandum to the Customs and Excise Amendment 
Bill, 1995 states that the purpose of amending the definition of “minerals” is to: 
…exclude from eligibility for the payment of rebate diesel fuel for use in 
extracting certain materials from the ground because they are valuable as 
extracted, rather than for the purpose of recovering their inherent mineral 
qualities.353 (Own emphasis.) 
 The second reading of the Minister emphasises that the definition of “minerals” was 
amended to exclude operations which “simply involve the extraction of sand, sandstone, soil, 
clay, granite, water and the like”.354 (Own emphasis.) The Minister further added: 
Until recently, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and the Federal Court 
have held the view that the term ‘mining for minerals’ in the [A]ct’s definition 
of ‘mining operations’ introduced a purposive test requiring a rebate claimant 
to demonstrate that the purpose of the claimant’s operations was to obtain a 
mineral or minerals embedded in the material that was extracted. 
For instance, there was a clear distinction between the extraction of sand per 
se and the extraction of sand with a view to obtaining from it minerals such as 
rutile, zircon or almandite. 
The meaning of ‘mining operations’ was therefore considered to be reasonably 
well settled until a recent decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal on 
the issue of extracting sand for use in the making  of concrete or for use as 
bedding sand in the construction industry. The Tribunal decided that the 
extraction of such sand was eligible for rebate. Claims have also been received 
for rebate on diesel fuel used in the pumping of ground water to be supplied as 
drinking water to towns.  
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These are, in the Government’s view, uses well beyond the intent of the 
Scheme, which was and is to deliver an assistance measure to mainstream 
mining pursuits. Accordingly, in item 7 of Schedule 1 to the bill, the 
Government has proposed to amend the definition of ‘minerals’ to exclude 
sand, sandstone, earth , soil, clay (other than bentonite or kaolin), basalt, 
granite, gravel, limestone or water. The exclusion is consistent with the 
principal mining legislation of the States and would bring about a transparent 
distinction between mining for minerals and operations that cannot, in the 
ordinary sense, be regarded as mining. Where these materials are extracted for 
the purpose of recovering a mineral, the extraction will remain eligible for 
rebate.355 (Own emphasis.) 
 It is thought that the Neumann Sands case and the Water Authority case led to the 
amendment of the definition of “minerals”.356 This is supported by the Minister’s second 
reading set out above.  
 In 1997 the definition of “mining operations” was also amended to read as follows: 
“mining operations” means 
(a) exploration, prospecting or mining for minerals, or the 
removal of overburden and other activities undertaken in the 
preparation of the site to enable mining for minerals to 
commence; or 
(b) operations for recovery of minerals, being: 
(i) mining for those minerals including the recovery of salts by 
evaporation; or 
(ii) the beneficiation of those minerals; or ores bearing those 
minerals; 
and includes 
... 
but does not include: 
(x) quarrying or dredging operations to the extent that the 
purpose of the operations is to obtain materials for use in 
building, road making, landscaping, construction or similar 
purposes. (own emphasis.) 
 The 1997 amendment broadened the definition of “mining operations” to specifically 
include preparatory activities. However, the relevant part of the definition for this study i.e. 
“mining for minerals” remained unchanged.   
                                                             
355 Ibid., MC 1478. 
356 Chief Executive Officer of Customs v Adelaide Brighton Cement Ltd, 139 Federal Court Reporter 147, para 
36 (2004). 
68 
 
 The following important cases were decided in terms of the amended definitions of 
“minerals” and “mining operations” and will be discussed below: Goliath Portland Cement 
Co Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of Customs (“the Goliath case”)357, David Mitchell Ltd v 
Chief Executive Officer of Customs (“the David Mitchell case”)358, CEO of Customs v 
Adelaide Brighton Cement Ltd (“the Adelaide case”)359 and In Re Midland Brick Company 
(Pty) Ltd and Chief Executive Officer of Customs (“the Midland case”)360. 
4.4.1 David (Mitchell) and Goliath 
 Goliath Portland Cement Co Ltd (“Goliath”) uses limestone to manufacture cement. 
Goliath extracts the limestone at Railton in Tasmania.361 The Railton-site contains deposits of 
more than 90% calcite.362 To make cement, heat is applied to the calcite in order to separate 
calcium oxide (lime) from calcium dioxide (waste).363 David Mitchell Ltd (“David Mitchell”) 
uses similar methods to extract limestone at Loongana and Lilydale also for the purpose of 
manufacturing cement. 
 In both the Goliath case and the David Mitchell case, the Chief Executive Officer of 
Customs (“the CEO”) refused to pay the DFR, contending that Goliath’s and David 
Mitchell’s operations are directed at extracting limestone and that, as limestone is excluded 
from the definition of minerals, Goliath and David Mitchell are not “mining for minerals”. 
Therefore, the CEO contended Goliath and David Mitchell are not conducting “mining 
operations” as required in order to claim the DFR.  
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 The AAT’s approach in both cases was to determine whether Goliath and David 
Mitchell extracted the limestone for its inherent mineral content. The AAT found in favour of 
both Goliath and David Mitchell, holding that: 
 the purpose of Goliath’s and David Mitchell’s operations are to extract lime;364 
 limestone is an “ore” therefore a mineral as defined;365  
 Goliath and David Mitchell are “mining for minerals”;366 and 
 based on the above Goliath and David Mitchell are conducting “mining 
operations”.367 
 In both cases the CEO appealed against the decisions of the AAT. The appeals were 
first heard by the single judge of the FCA who found in favour of the CEO. In the Goliath 
case, 368 Heerey J upheld the CEO’s appeal from the AAT’s decision holding that:  
If ‘limestone’ has been expressly excluded from the statutory 
definition of ‘minerals’ it seems to me to follow inexorably that 
the essential and defining component of limestone, namely 
calcite, must also be excluded. One cannot mine for calcite 
without mining for limestone, and vice versa. Goliath's 
argument requires treating the exclusion as if it read ‘(other than 
agricultural use limestone or limestone where what is sought is 
not the limestone as such, but a mineral that is found in the 
limestone)’.369 
 Heerey J found it instructive that the legislator excluded limestone for agricultural use 
from the limestone-exclusion and bentonite and kaolin from the clay-exclusion.370 According 
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to the Heerey J, this is an indication that Parliament intended that there be no “further 
exception for clay (or limestone) with reference to its components”.371 
 In the David Mitchell case, Ryan J agreed with the reasoning by Heerey J in the 
Goliath case holding that the extraction of limestone for its calcite content could not be said 
to be “mining operations”.372 Ryan J further considered whether by characterising David 
Mitchell’s operations as the recovery of calcite (as opposed to the recovery of limestone for 
its calcite content) David Mitchell’s activities could amount to “mining operations”.373 Ryan 
J found it unnecessary to answer this question as David Mitchell extracts limestone and not 
calcite.374 This is because nothing was done to separate the calcite from the limestone once 
extracted.375 Ryan J also did not accept that lime is a “mineral” based on the statutory 
construction of the definition of “mineral” as being something “mined for”.376 Therefore, 
Ryan J held that David Mitchell was not “mining for minerals” and upheld the CEO’s 
appeal.377  
 An interesting anomaly was pointed out by David Mitchell in the David Mitchell case: 
where marble, which is metamorphosed limestone, is extracted for the purpose of producing 
lime, it will qualify for the DFR, while the extraction of limestone for the same purposes will 
not qualify.378 In answer to this, Ryan J replied with a response characteristic of a literalist 
view of statutory interpretation coupled with a strict interpretation of the judiciary’s role in 
law-making: 
That anomaly, if it be one, results from the intractable language of the 
definition of “minerals” and the express exception therefrom of “limestone”. If 
                                                             
371 Ibid., para 26-29. 
372 Chief Executive Officer of Customs v David Mitchell Ltd, 1611, para 23 (1999). 
373 Ibid., para 24-37. 
374 Ibid., para 37. 
375 Ibid. 
376 Ibid., para 38-45. 
377 Ibid., para 46. 
378 Ibid., para 47. 
71 
 
policy considerations mandate the removal of this suggested anomaly, they 
will be for Parliament, and not the Court, to implement.379  
 After Ryan J’s decision in the David Mitchell case, Goliath lodged a further appeal to 
the full court of the FCA. Goliath contended that Heerey J erred in holding that lime was 
covered by the exclusion of limestone from the definition of “minerals”.380 Goliath further 
submitted that the purpose was to recover calcite from limestone and overall lime.381  
 The full court emphasised that the test is whether the object of Goliath’s operations 
were to recover a “mineral” and it is after recovery of this “mineral” that the “mining 
operations” ends.382 The full court held that it could not be said that “lime” was a “mineral” 
recovered as it was not obtained by mining.383 Furthermore, Goliath’s object was to recover 
limestone and not calcite and therefore it is unnecessary to consider whether the exclusion of 
limestone includes an exclusion of limestone’s constituents.384  
 In an obiter statement the full court said that even if it was found that Goliath’s object 
was in fact to recover calcite, it could not agree with the statements made by Heerey J to the 
effect that the exclusion of limestone includes an exclusion of limestone’s constituents:385 
An exclusion from beneficial legislation should not, in our view, be read 
widely unless it is clear that it was intended to incorporate more than is 
conveyed, namely the stated material. Calcite cannot, as a matter of language, 
be regarded as a derivative of the word limestone (as to which see Pearce, D. 
C., Statutory Interpretation in Australia, 4th ed. Sydney: Butterworths, 1996. 
[6.41]). The reference in the exclusion allowing for two constituents of clay 
should not be regarded as concluding the question whether the constituents of 
each of the materials there referred to were also to be taken as excluded, 
unless they were in turn excepted from it. At the most it creates an uncertainty. 
The extrinsic materials to which regard might then be had to resolve the 
question show that it was not intended to refuse rebate where a mineral within 
the stated minerals was sought to be recovered.386 
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 After the full court’s decision in the Goliath case, David Mitchell also appealed to the 
full court from Ryan J’s judgement. The full court disagreed with the judgement of Ryan J 
that calcite was included in the exclusion of limestone and rather agreed with the obiter 
statement by the full court in Goliath holding that that it was open to the AAT to find that 
David Mitchell’s operations were geared toward the extraction of calcite.387 However, the full 
court did agree with Ryan J that the beneficiation of calcite after recovery of the limestone 
was directed toward the recovery of lime (which is not a mineral) and therefore does not fall 
within the definition of “mining operations”.388 Based on this the full court found that the 
diesel fuel used to extract calcite (a “mineral”) would qualify for the DFR, but that the diesel 
fuel used to produce the subsequent product lime (which is not a “mineral”) would not 
qualify for the DFR.389  
 In both the Goliath case and the David Mitchell case the full court applied a purposive 
test. The full court did not apply the informed general usage test, although limestone may 
constitute a mineral in terms of the informed general usage test, the test could not assist 
Goliath or David Mitchell. This is because limestone is specifically excluded from the 
definition of “minerals”. The informed general usage test therefore becomes irrelevant for 
purposes of the Customs Act where the substance extracted is one of the excluded substances 
e.g. limestone or clay.  
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4.4.2 The Adelaide Brighton case  
The AAT’s findings of fact and decision 
 Adelaide Brighton Cement Ltd (“Adelaide”) extracts a substance, commonly known 
as limestone, to manufacture cement.390 Adelaide applied for the DFR for fuel used in 
prospecting, extraction and processing of limestone from 1995 to 2001.391 The CEO refused 
the applications and Adelaide applied to the AAT for a review of the CEO’s decision.392  
 The main issue in the Adelaide case was whether Adelaide used the diesel fuel in 
“mining operations” as defined in section 164(7) of the Customs Act.393 This issue turns on 
whether Adelaide is “mining for minerals” as contemplated in paragraph (a) of the 
aforementioned definition, keeping in mind that limestone is specifically excluded from the 
definition of “minerals” in section 167(4) of the Customs Act.394 
 The AAT agreed with the full court in State Rail Authority (NSW) v Collector of 
Customs395 that, when determining whether an applicant is conducting “mining operations” 
“the concept of the recovery of minerals is…the central point of reference”.396 The following 
essential observations and findings were made by the AAT: 
 The mere fact that the end product contains minerals is not enough for the extraction 
of that product to be said to be “mining for minerals”.397  
 The end-use to which a product is put cannot determine whether the extraction of that 
product constitutes “mining operations”.398  
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 The definition of “minerals” encompasses substances which would not be regarded as 
minerals for geological purposes.399 This is evidenced by the inclusion of liquids and 
gasses in the definition of “minerals” which does not agree with the ordinary meaning 
of the word “minerals”.400  
 Although Adelaide’s public relations material refer to “limestone”, it is clear that 
Adelaide only uses limestone with particular qualities.401 For example, Adelaide 
places specific emphasis on the chemical content of the limestone it extracts.402  
 Lime does not occur naturally in the deposits extracted by Adelaide but is formed 
after the release of carbon dioxide from the calcium carbonite.403 
 The cement produced by Adelaide Brighton must contain the following materials in 
the following proportions: calcite (85%), silica (19,5%), alumina (1,5%) and 
haematite (1,2%).404 
 Adelaide is extracting limestone.405 However, it is not doing it for the purpose of it 
being limestone, but rather for the four specific minerals inherent in limestone i.e. 
calcite, silica, alumina and haematite.406  
 The fact that Adelaide does not separate the minerals before using them in the 
production of cement is irrelevant.407 The ultimate purpose is not for the extraction of 
these four minerals, but rather for the production of cement.408  
 The Adelaide case can be distinguished from the Goliath case on the basis that in the 
last mentioned case what was extracted (i.e. limestone) is not the mineral which was 
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sought (i.e. lime).409 Lime is only present later after certain chemical reactions.410 The 
Adelaide case is more similar to the David Mitchell case where it was found that 
David Mitchell is partially mining for calcite which is a mineral.411  
 An appeal by the CEO to a single judge of the FCA was dismissed. The CEO lodged a 
further appeal to the full court of the FCA where the CEO argued that the limestone exclusion 
will apply unless it is “agricultural use limestone” or the minerals constituting the limestone 
are separated at no later than stockpiling.412 Adelaide on the other hand submitted that the 
purpose of its operations was not to extract “limestone as such”, but rather to obtain the four 
minerals contained in the extracted limestone and therefore the limestone exclusion does not 
apply.413  
The majority’s decision – per Tamberlin, Sackville and Finn JJ 
 The majority noted that section 15AB(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act, No. 2 of 1901 
provides that the explanatory memorandum or second reading speech to a bill may be 
considered where a provision in an Act is ambiguous or to confirm the ordinary meaning of a 
provision.414 On this basis the Explanatory Memorandum to the Customs and Excise 
Amendment Bill and the secondary reading speech of the Minister suggest that the purpose of 
the amendment of the definition of “minerals” is to exclude limestone which is useful “as is” 
from the DFR (for example for use as a building material), but not to exclude limestone 
extracted for its “inherent mineral qualities”.415 Based on this the majority confirmed the 
findings of the AAT and the single judge of the FCA and dismissed the appeal of the CEO.416  
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 The majority did not view their decision as inconsistent with the decision in the 
Goliath case.417 In that case the problem for Goliath was that the mineral lime, was not 
present when the material was extracted and therefore Goliath could not be said to be 
“mining for minerals”.418 It was therefore unnecessary for the FCA in the Goliath case to 
decide whether the exclusion of limestone included an exclusion of limestone’s 
constituents.419 The FCA did, however, state obiter that the exclusion only applied to 
“limestone as such” and a wide interpretation should only be given where it is clear that the 
exclusion intended to apply to more than is conveyed.420 This, according to the majority in 
the Adelaide case, is consistent with its interpretation of the exclusion.421  
 There were two minority decisions per Black CJ and Selway J.  
The minority decisions – per Black CJ 
 Black CJ considered the Neumann Sands case which he views as the AAT decision 
referred to in the second reading.422 Black CJ noted that both Neumann Sands and Adelaide 
extracts material which is useful as extracted.423 The material (sand and limestone 
respectively) was extracted because its mineral content and physical attributes made it useful 
for its purpose and in each case, the material retained its physical nature.424 Black CJ inferred 
that the intention of the legislator was to exclude those materials which would inappropriately 
be included as minerals under the purposive test as applied in the Boral Bricks case and 
effectively reverse the result brought on by the Neumann Sands case.425 
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 Black CJ further considered the decisions in the Goliath case and David Mitchell 
case.426 He referred to the following obiter passage in the Goliath case where the full court 
disagreed with the court a quo that all constituents of limestone must also be excluded from 
the definition of minerals:427 
…we are however respectfully unable to agree with His Honour 
the primary judge…that any more was intended by the 
exclusion than a reference to limestone as such.428 
 It is on the basis of this passage that Adelaide relies to argue that the intention of the 
legislature is to limit the limestone exclusion to “limestone as such”.429 Black CJ, however, is 
of the view that Adelaide’s interpretation of this passage is wrong.430 He argues that the 
expression “limestone as such” was used in the Goliath case to distinguish mining operations, 
where calcite is the substance present at the end of the extraction process, from mining 
operations where limestone is the substance present at the end, regardless of whether the 
limestone was extracted for its physical characteristics or its mineral content.431 According to 
Black CJ, the full court in the Goliath case meant that where calcite is separated from 
limestone, it will not be caught by the limestone exclusion, and therefore the full court in the 
Goliath case could not agree with the court a quo in that case that all constituents of 
limestone must be excluded from the definition of “minerals” in all situations.432  
 Black CJ further considered the full court in David Mitchell’s application of the obiter 
passage in the Goliath case.433 He criticised the finding by the full court in the David Mitchell 
case that the AAT’s finding that David Mitchell mined for the mineral calcite was a finding 
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of fact.434 According to Black CJ, this was rather a question of law i.e. was section 164(7) of 
the Customs Act correctly applied?435 Black CJ is of the view that the full court in the David 
Mitchell case thought itself bound by the AAT’s findings and that had it been pointed out to 
the full court that the AAT’s finding was not a finding of fact, but a finding of law, the 
decision in the David Mitchell case might have been different.436  
 Black CJ held that Adelaide is not entitled to the DFR as it did not separate the 
minerals it mined for from limestone.437 This is so, he continued, because, 
the exception to the definition of ‘minerals’ extends to all 
situations in which an excepted material is present at the 
conclusion of the mining operations, whether that material has 
been extracted for its physical, chemical or mineral 
properties.438 
 He acknowledged that the view he has taken leads to an inconsistency between the 
extraction of limestone compared to marble where both is used for the end-purpose of 
manufacturing cement.439 However, Black CJ is of the view that this is a matter for the 
legislature to resolve.440 In this regard, he expressed the view that an amendment to the 
legislation to the effect that certain activities are excluded from mining operations rather than 
materials would resolve this inconsistency and lead to greater certainty of the legislature’s 
intended application of the DFR.441 
The minority decisions – per Selway J 
 Selway emphasised that the meaning of “mining operations” involves the application 
of a purposive test.442 This test is subjective and involves a question of fact.443 He further 
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considered the decisions in the Goliath case and the David Mitchell case and expressed the 
view that there is an inconsistency between the two decisions.444 According to Selway, the 
full court in the David Mitchell case and the AAT in the Adelaide case wrongly viewed each 
mineral as mutually exclusive.445 According to Selway,  
[t]he assumption involves an error in interpretation that because 
a thing has a particular name, it must be different from 
something with a different name. The identification of an 
appropriate name is thus viewed as a conclusion as to its nature 
and character.446 
 Selway was of the view that the Adelaide case should be remitted to the AAT for a 
consideration whether the material extracted by Adelaide was limestone or limestone and one 
or more minerals.447  
4.4.3 The Midland case 
 Midland Brick Company (Pty) Ltd (“Midland”) extracts certain materials, colloquially 
known as “clay”, for the manufacture of bricks.448 Midland applied to the CEO for access to 
the DFR on the basis that its extraction operations constitutes “mining for minerals” as 
contemplated in the definition of “mining operations”.449 The CEO refused the DFR 
application as it was of the view that Midland is mining for clay, which is excluded from the 
definition of “minerals” and on that basis Midland’s operations do not constitute “mining 
operations”.450  
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 The AAT was called to review the above refusal by the CEO. The question before the 
AAT was whether Midland is “mining for minerals” as contemplated in the definition of 
“mining operations”.451  
 According to the AAT the correct approach to be applied is that of the majority in the 
Adelaide case.452 It therefore needs to be determined whether Midland is mining for 
“minerals” or mining for clay (which is excluded from the definition of “minerals”).453  This 
is an enquiry into the objective purpose of Midland in extracting the materials.454 The 
objective purpose is determined by weighing all the relevant factors.455 
 Midland asserted that the purpose of its operations is to extract the minerals kaolin, 
illite and silica i.e. minerals which are not excluded from the definition of “minerals”.456 
According to the AAT the evidence does not support this alleged purpose.457 The AAT 
weighed the following factors: 
 All customer material describes the material extracted by Midland as clay.458 No 
reference is made in any of the customer material to kaolin, illite or silica.459  
 All Midland’s licenses are for clay.460 Midland does not own any license for kaolin, 
illite or silica.461  
 Midland has nine requirements for the raw material it extracts.462 Although four of 
these requirements relate to the raw material’s chemical content, there are no 
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requirements with regard to mineral content.463 No specific limits or mix 
specifications are set with regard to kaolin, illite or silica.464  
 More than once a day and 3000 times a year Midland tests the extracted raw material 
for physical properties.465 Midland only provided evidence of one mineral test 
conducted and the AAT was of the view that this was done with the litigation before 
the tribunal in mind.466  
 No evidence is provided on the mineral content of the clay extracted for which 
Midland claimed the DFR.467  
 Based on this the AAT found that Midland was mining for clay and not mining for 
“minerals.”468 The AAT found the facts in the Midland case distinguishable from those in the 
Adelaide case.469 The AAT pointed out that Adelaide was mining for specific minerals in 
specific proportions.470 However, in the Midland case, the AAT could not find any evidence 
that Midland was mining for specific minerals in specific proportions.471 In this regard, a 
broad relationship between mineralogy and the material extracted is not sufficient. 472 
According to the AAT if this were the case, it would always be arguable that the use of clay 
depends on its mineral content and therefore, the exclusion of clay would have no practical 
effect.473 The AAT therefore confirmed the CEO’s decision denying Midland’s DFR 
application.  
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4.5 Conclusion 
 The meaning of “mining operations” and “mineral”, both in the context of the 
ITSSCAA and the Customs Act, have been considered extensively by the AAT and 
Australian courts.  While the ITSSCAA is no longer in force, the decisions dealing with the 
meaning of “mining operations” and “mineral” still remain relevant for purposes of this study 
to the extent that they are applied to the same terms as used in the Customs Act.  
 Pre-1995, a wide approach was followed in interpreting the meaning of these terms 
and any substance which is a mineral in terms of the informed general usage test was 
considered to be a “mineral” for purposes of the Customs Act. Post-1995 the informed 
general usage test no longer provided the necessary relief for DFR applicants extracting 
substances which are colloquially known as limestone, clay or any of the excluded 
substances. This is because although limestone and clay may be minerals in terms of the 
informed general usage test, they are specifically excluded from the amended definition of 
“minerals”. Consequently, post-1995 the AAT and the FCA applies a purposive test post-
1995 to determine whether a DFR applicant is conducting “mining operations”. In an 
oversimplification, in terms of the purposive test, a DFR applicant will be said to be 
conducting “mining operations” if the purpose of its operations is to extract a “mineral”.  
83 
 
CHAPTER 5: A SAVIGNIAN’S ANALYSIS OF THE DEFINITION OF “MINING 
OPERATIONS”  
5.1 Introduction 
 Against the background provided for in chapters 1-4, the purpose of chapter 5 is to 
interpret the definition of “mining operations” in terms of the Savignian interpretation model 
set out in chapter 2. In what follows, each technique of the Savignian interpretation model 
will be considered separately and applied to the definition of “mining operations”. In 
applying the first four techniques the definition of “mining operations” is interpreted in an SA 
context, after which a comparison is drawn between such an interpretation and the 
interpretation followed in Australia. Lastly, Chapter 5 answers the research question and 
concludes whether the extraction of clay for brickmaking and limestone for the manufacture 
of cement in principle constitute “mining operations” for purposes of the ITA. 
5.2 Grammatical technique 
 The theory behind the grammatical technique is explained at 2.5.1. In chapter 3, the 
grammatical technique is applied to analyse the words used in the definition of “mining 
operations”, specifically the words “include”, “every” “any” and “mineral”. The ordinary 
meanings of the words “include”, “every” and “any” show that generally these words are 
used to extend the ordinary meaning of a defined term. It is further noted that the word 
“include” can also be used where a definition is meant to be exhaustive. In each case the 
context in which the word “include” is used will be decisive.  
 Chapter 3 analyses the meaning of “mineral”, a term central to the definition of 
“mining operations”. The dictionary meaning of the term “mineral” is framed widely to 
include any “substance obtained by mining”. It is thought that the ordinary meaning of the 
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term “mineral” is neither fixed nor certain and that depending on the context the term can be 
used in limitation or expansion.  
 In terms of the grammatical technique, courts should give effect to every word, unless 
the court is of the opinion that the words used are superfluous in light of the purpose of the 
legislation. In other words, in the absence of any indication to the contrary, it is assumed that 
the legislator had a specific intention with the words used. Applied to the definition of 
“mining operations”, the use of general words such as “include”, “every” and “any” coupled 
with the flexible “mineral” indicate that the legislature intended the definition of “mining 
operations” to be wider than its ordinary meaning.  
5.3 Contextual technique 
 As mentioned above, the context in which words such as “include” and “mineral” is 
used will determine whether such terms are used in expansion or limitation of the ordinary 
meaning of “mining operations”. The theory behind the contextual technique is explained at 
2.5.2. The application of the contextual technique to the definition of “mining operations will 
consider both the intra-textual and extra-textual dimension. 
5.3.1 Extra-textual dimension 
 The extra-textual dimension determines that the social, political and economic context 
in which the legislation is framed (and continues to be framed) is to be considered. The 
purpose of the 100% capital expenditure allowance is to compensate mining companies for 
the inherent and extrinsic risks they face, in acknowledgement of the role the mining industry 
played and continues to play in the social and economic development of SA. At the time of 
the introduction of the 100% capital expenditure allowance (early 1970s), the mining industry 
contributed double digits to SA’s gross domestic product (“GDP”), peaking at 19,4% during 
1980. Currently, the mining industry contributes about 7% to SA’s GDP.  
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 The 2016 Tax Statistics note that the collection of Corporate Income Tax was 
“severely impacted by the deterioration in commodity prices”.474 It is further noted that the 
“mining industry in particular was impacted by depressed markets, oversupply in the market, 
falling commodity prices, high mining costs, and Rand/Dollar fluctuations”.475 The table 
below shows the severe decline in tax revenue collected by SARS (especially from 2014 to 
2015) from the “mining and quarrying” sector:476 
 
2012 2013 2014 2015 
Number of taxpayers 2235 2290 2063 1300 
Taxable income (R million) 19685 15904 -4436 -26544 
Assessed tax (R million) 14096 15142 11582 3183 
 
 Even though the mining industry has suffered severely under the realisation of 
inherent and external risks, which has led to a decrease in the industry’s contribution to SA’s 
GDP and SARS tax revenue, as will be noted at 5.4 and 5.5, the mining industry still makes a 
valuable and irreplaceable contribution to SA, both socially and economically.  
5.3.2 Intra-textual dimension 
 The long title of the ITA reads as follows:  
To consolidate the law relating to the taxation of incomes and donations, to 
provide for the recovery of taxes on persons, to provide for the deduction by 
employers of amounts from the remuneration of employees in respect of 
certain tax liabilities of employees, and to provide for the making of 
provisional tax payments and for the payment into the National Revenue Fund 
of portions of the normal tax and interest and other charges in respect of such 
taxes, and to provide for related matters. 
                                                             
474 National Treasury and SARS, "2016 Tax Statistics," ed. Department of National Treasury (2016), 129. 
475 Ibid., 235. 
476 Ibid., 147-49. 
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It is submitted that the long title does not assist in interpreting the meaning of “mining 
operations” in the context of the 100% capital expenditure allowance. This is because the 
100% capital expenditure allowance is a specific concession to the normal taxing regime.  
 The definition of “mining operations is contained in section 1. The heading and 
opening words of section 1 reads as follows:  
1.   Interpretation.—(1)  In this Act, unless the context otherwise indicates. 
In this regard, the Nyasaland Quarries case provides authority that the definition of “mining 
operations” is wider than the ordinary meaning of the term. Therefore, the definition of 
“mining operations” (and not the ordinary meaning) should therefore be applied where 
“mining operations” is used in the ITA, unless the context indicates otherwise. 
 The 100% capital expenditure allowance is provided for in section 15(a) read with 
section 36. The headings of the relevant sections read as follows:  
15.   Deductions from income derived from mining operations. 
36.   Calculation of redemption allowance and unredeemed balance of 
capital expenditure in connection with mining operations. 
These sections do not give any indication that the definition of “mining operations” in section 
1(1) of the ITA should be deviated from. However, apart from this observation, no further 
assistance is derived from an intra-textual analysis of the definition of “mining operations”.  
5.4 Value technique 
 The theoretical background to the value technique is set out in 2.5.3. When 
interpreting the meaning of “mining operations” an interpretation which promotes the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights should be followed.477 In this regard, the government 
                                                             
477 "Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,"  section 39(2). 
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has an obligation to inter alia progressively make available and ensure access to everyone to 
basic and further education and adequate housing.478  
 According to the Chamber of Mines of South Africa, the mining industry spent 
roughly R2 billion in local mining and labour sending communities during 2016.479 This 
expenditure was used for direct and indirect job creation, the provision of learnerships and 
bursaries, improving access to clean water, sanitation, roads and access to healthcare, etc.480 
In this regard, providing tax incentives to mining companies can assist the Government in 
fulfilling their constitutional obligations.481 Therefore, it is submitted that a wider 
interpretation (as opposed to SARS’ narrow interpretation) should find constitutional favour.  
5.5 Historical Technique 
 The theory behind the historical technique is set out at 2.5.4. As mentioned there, 
when applying the historical technique the emphasis should not lie on the historical facts 
which led to the provision of the 100% capital expenditure allowance, but rather the 
“mischief” to which the legislation is aimed.  
 The 100% capital expenditure allowance is granted in lieu of certain other less 
favourable allowances.482 Therefore, in order to prevent the abuse of the 100% capital 
expenditure allowance, certain restrictions on claiming the allowance were put in place. 
Firstly, the allowance is only available to producing mines.483 Secondly, it can only be 
deducted from “mining income”.484 Thirdly, the allowance is ring fenced to a specific mine 
i.e. the capital expenditure in respect of a mine can only be deducted against the mining 
                                                             
478 Ibid., sections 26; 29. 
479 Chamber of Mines of South Africa, "Mine SA," (http://www.chamberofmines.org.za/industry-news/publications/facts-and-
figures ( accessed 12 July, 2017) 2016), 29. 
480 Ibid. 
481 Ibid. 
482 Income Tax Act, section 15(a). 
483 Ibid., section 36(7C). 
484 Ibid., section 15(a). 
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income of that same mine.485 Partial relaxation of the third restriction is available where 
mining operations commenced after 14 March 1990. In this regard, the “old mine” can deduct 
capital expenditure incurred in respect of the “new mine”, limited to 25% of the taxable 
income of the “old mine” after deduction of the “old mine’s’” own capital expenditure.486 
 Historically, the 100% capital expenditure allowance was only available to new gold 
mines (i.e. mining leases granted after 28 February 1946).487 Only in 1973 did the legislator 
extend the capital expenditure allowance to all mines. In 1987 the Margo Commission 
recommended the abolishment of the 100% capital allowances and its replacement with a 
50/30/20 accelerated allowances.488 The Margo Commission acknowledged that such a 
change might have an adverse impact on investment in the mining industry.489 However, the 
purpose of this was to ensure consistency among the mining and manufacturing industries 
which found favour with the Government.490 The acceptance of this recommendation was 
made dependent on the findings of a Technical Working Group.491 The Technical Working 
Group led to the Report of the Technical Committee on Mining Taxation chaired by Dr G 
Marais.492 
 The Marais Committee acknowledged that both the 100% capital expenditure 
allowance and the recommended 50/30/20 capital expenditure allowance are acceptable under 
a neutral tax regime.493 However, the Marais Committee recommended that the 100% capital 
expenditure allowance be retained as the 50/30/20 allowance would potentially have an 
adverse effect on investment in the mining industry.494 Furthermore, the Marais Committee 
favoured the simplicity of the 100% capital expenditure allowance above the 50/30/20 
                                                             
485 Ibid., section 36(7F). 
486 Ibid., section 36(7G). 
487 Van Blerk, C-7. 
488 C.S. Margo, "White Paper on The Report of the Commission of Inquiry Into the Tax Structure of the Republic of South 
Africa," (Pretoria: The Government Printer, 1987), 17. 
489 Ibid., 17  
490 Ibid., 17. 
491 Ibid., 16. 
492 G. Marais, "Report of the Technical Committee on Mining Taxation," (1988). 
493 Ibid., 36. 
494 Ibid., 68. 
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allowance, as the nature of mining operations make it difficult to distinguish between capital 
expenditure and revenue expenditure.495 Such distinction would become relevant under a 
50/30/20 regime where only revenue expenditure (and no longer revenue expenditure) would 
qualify for a 100% deduction during the year it was incurred.496 It was further recommended 
that the ring fencing provisions be amended to provide a discretion to the Minister of Finance 
to relax or waive the ring fencing provisions if and when it considered it necessary.497 During 
the 1989 tax amendments the Government retained the 100% capital expenditure allowance 
and the ring fencing of tax provisions, rejecting the relaxation thereof.   
 In 2015 the Davis Tax Committee (“DTC”) recommended that the 100% capital 
expenditure allowance be abolished in favour of an allowance spread over a period of four 
years (40/20/20/20), similar to allowances available to the manufacturing allowances.498 This 
recommendation is in line with the DTC’s general view that the incentives should be 
provided for in the market and that the tax system should be neutral. In its first interim report, 
the DTC rejected the Marais Committee’s view that it is difficult to distinguish between 
capital and revenue expenditure in the mining industry.499 According to the DTC this 
distinction is made in any event by taxpayers as they “maintain this information for 
accounting and record keeping purposes”.500 It is clear that this view propounded by the DTC 
is flawed. It is a well-established principle that what is capital expenditure for accounting 
purposes is not necessarily capital expenditure for tax purposes.501  
 The DTC further recommends the removal of the ring fencing provisions.502 
According to the DTC, this would further parity between the mining industry and the 
                                                             
495 Ibid., 69. 
496 Ibid. 
497 Ibid., 84. 
498 Davis Tax Committee,  62. 
499 Ibid. 
500 Ibid., 59. 
501 See Sub-Nigal Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 15 South African Tax Cases 381, 389 (1984). 
502  61. 
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manufacturing industry.503 However, the DTC also recommends that, unlike for 
manufacturing assets, the mining asset be depreciated from the date the capital expenditure is 
incurred (and not the date the asset is brought into use).504  
 It is noted that the DTC’s recommendations have not resulted in amendments to the 
ITA as of yet and that the 100% capital expenditure allowance (and accompanying ring 
fencing provisions) remain intact.   
5.6 Comparative technique 
 The theory behind the comparative technique is set out at 2.5.5 Although SA courts 
are not bound by foreign law, they have constitutional permission to derive assistance from it. 
This study identified Australia as a comparative jurisdiction for the following reasons: 
 Australia, like SA, is abundant with mineral resources; 
 Unlike SA, the meaning of “mining operations” and “mineral” have been considered 
extensively in Australia, both in the context of the ITSSCAA and the Customs Act; 
and 
 SARS, SA courts and SA academic writers refer to Australian case law in interpreting 
the meaning of “mining operations” and “mineral”.  
 With regard to the ITSSCA, a narrow view of the meaning of “mining operations” 
was expressed by the court in the NSW case, limiting the “mining operations” to those 
operations which are extracted through underground workings unless it would not be an 
unnatural stretch of language to hold that the extraction of a substance through open cast 
workings constitutes “mining operations”. On the application of this case to the definition of 
“mining operations” in the FITA the court in the Nyasaland Quarries case held as follows: 
Counsel for the appellant placed great reliance upon the Australian case of 
New South Wales Associated Blue Metals Quarries, Ltd. v The Federal 
                                                             
503 Ibid., 62. 
504 Ibid. 
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Commissioner of Taxes. That case, however, as I read it, was decided upon the 
ordinary everyday meaning of the terms ‘mining’ and ‘mining operations’, and 
I must confess that my impression upon reading the various passages, upon 
which counsel relied, is that if the legislature in defining ‘mining’ and ‘mining 
operations’, as it did in section 2 of the Act, had intended to make it clear that 
the decision in that case was to have no application in the Federation they 
could hardly have found words more suitable for this purpose.505 
 In this regard it is again emphasised that the definition of FITA is substantially the 
same as the definition in the ITA. On this basis it is submitted that the narrow interpretation 
of “mining operations” in the NSW case has no application to interpreting the same phrase as 
defined in the ITA. Although the North Australian Cement case was also decided under the 
ITSSCA, it is applied in the context of the Customs Act and the case’s formulation of the 
informed general usage test is also referred to by SARS in the draft IN and by Van Blerk. To 
that extent, the North Australian Cement case remains relevant in interpreting the meaning of 
“mining operations” in the context of the Customs Act.  
 Unlike the ITSSCA, the Customs Act pre-1995 contained definitions of “mining 
operations” and “minerals”. Central to the definition of “mining operations” is the phrase 
“mining for minerals”. “Minerals” is defined very widely and the definition is similar to the 
terms ordinary dictionary meaning.  The ITA, on the other hand, only defines “mining 
operations”. This definition is arguably wider than the Customs Act’s definition as it uses 
phrases of expansion such as “includes”, “any” and “every”. In comparison, the Customs 
Act’s definition uses the phrase “means” and further excludes certain quarrying operations 
from the definition of “mining operations”. However, the most important similarity between 
the two definitions is the central position held by the term “mineral”. The Bell case, 
established the informed general usage test in the context of the Customs Act. The Neumann 
Sands case applied the informed general usage test and found that in extracting sand for its 
silica content and by use of methods which could properly be described as “mining”, 
                                                             
505 Commissioner of Taxes v Nyasaland Quarries and Mining Co Ltd, 582. 
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Neumann Sands was “mining for minerals”. In this regard, it should be noted that the 
Customs Act requires that an applicant be “mining for minerals”, while the ITA includes 
“every method” by which a mineral is extracted. This further supports the contention that the 
definition of “mining operations” in the ITA is wider than that same definition in the 
Customs Act and certainly includes the extraction of minerals through open cast workings. 
The Water Authority case, decided after Neumann Sands, applied the characterisation test 
holding that the question is whether an applicant’s purpose in conducting its operations were 
to extract a mineral. This, according to the AAT is the conclusive test. 
 As mentioned in Chapter 4, it is believed that the Neumann Sands and Water 
Authority cases led to the amendment of the definition of “minerals” to exclude certain 
substances from that definition, notably “clay” and “limestone”. In the David Mitchell and 
Goliath cases, post-1995, the court applied a purposive test (similar to the test applied in the 
Water Authority case), and not the informed general usage test. The full FCA in these cases 
was precluded from applying the informed general usage test, because limestone is 
specifically excluded from the definition of “minerals”. In this regard, it should be noted that 
the ITA does not contain a definition of “minerals” and therefore does not exclude any 
substance from the meaning of “minerals”.  
 The purposive test was applied by the majority of the FCA in the Adelaide Brighton 
case and afterwards, by the AAT in the Midland Brick case. The two cases highlight the 
factual circumstances a court will take into account to determine whether an applicant is 
“mining for minerals”. These factual circumstances include whether: 
 public relation and customer material refer to the mineral content or mineral 
characteristics of the substance extracted; 
 the mining licences are in the name of the mineral extracted; 
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 internal documentation set out specific mineral composition requirements for the 
substance which is extracted;  and 
 extensive mineral composition tests are conducted on a regular basis. 
 In this regard, this study submits that the purposive test should be applied in the 
context of the ITA to determine whether a taxpayer is conducting “mining operations”. In 
such a case, even if a court should decide that clay and limestone are not minerals in the 
context of the definition of “mining operations”, the extraction of clay and limestone would 
still qualify as “mining operations” provided it can be proved that it is extracted for its 
mineral content. Furthermore, the factual circumstances set out above provide useful 
guidelines to determine whether a taxpayer’s purpose is to extract a mineral.  
 If the purposive test is applied to clay and limestone in South Africa, the extraction of 
clay for brickmaking and limestone for cement manufacture would constitute “mining 
operations” provided the purpose of the extraction is to recover the clay and limestone for 
their mineral content.  
5.7 Conclusion 
 The Savignian interpretation model provides a useful and systematic method of 
interpreting the meaning of “mining operations” for income tax purposes. In terms of the 
grammatical analysis of the definition of “mining operations” it is concluded that a wider 
interpretation of that definition should be followed. This is supported by the application of 
the contextual technique which highlights that the original purpose behind the provision of 
the 100% capital expenditure allowance favours such a wider interpretation.   
 The value technique recognises the important role the mining industry can play in 
fulfilling the Government’s constitutional obligations and therefore, further supports a wider 
interpretation of the meaning of “mining operations”. The application of the technique shows 
that despite the potential for abuse of the 100% capital expenditure allowance through a wide 
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interpretation of “mining operations”, the ring fencing provisions provide internal checks and 
balances to sufficiently guard against such an abuse.  
 Finally, in comparing the interpretation of “mining operations” in Australia with 
South Africa, it is recommended that the purposive test applied in Australia should be 
adopted in SA. In this regard useful guidelines in applying the purposive test was also 
identified and set out at 5.6. In applying the purposive test, it is concluded that provided clay 
and limestone are extracted for their mineral content, the extraction operations will, in 
principle, constitute “mining operations”. Although this will ultimately depend on the 
specific facts before a court, it is thought that the purposive test provides sufficient guidelines 
and certainly to extractors of clay and limestone regarding their entitlement to the 100% 
capital expenditure allowance.   
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